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I. INTRODUCTION
Promissory notes are ubiquitous in commercial lending.1  The
promissory note represents the borrower’s promise to repay.2  The
Uniform Commercial Code’s Article 3 (Article 3) governs promissory
notes.3  Under Article 3, promissory notes are either demand instru-
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
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1. See THOMAS S. HEMMENDINGER, HILLMAN ON COMMERCIAL LOAN DOCUMENTATION,
ch. 9 (5th ed. 2004) (discussing the use of promissory notes in commercial lending
and noting that “[m]ost loan transactions will include a promissory note.”); id. at
9:1.
2. See U.C.C. § 3-104 (2002); HEMMENDINGER, supra note 1 at 9:1–9:10.
3. See U.C.C. § 3-102, cmt. 2 (2002) (discussing the relevance of Article 3 to non-
negotiable instruments); see also id. § 3-104 (2002).
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ments or time instruments.4  In general, the holder of a demand in-
strument may decide to demand payment at any time and for any
reason,5 while the holder of a time note must wait for payment until
the arrival of the specific repayment date or dates included in the
note.6  For this reason, time notes usually contain an acceleration
clause.7  An acceleration clause allows the holder to accelerate—move
forward in time—the maturity date of the note if certain events oc-
cur.8  These events, usually defined as “events of default,” typically
indicate a decline in the borrower’s credit rating.9  An acceleration
clause allows the lender to require (demand) payment of the loan
early, but only if an event of default occurs.10  Given the fact that most
commercial borrowers plan an illiquid use of the borrowed funds it
may seem odd that demand notes are also often used in the commer-
cial lending context.11  However, many lenders see advantages in us-
ing demand notes.12  These advantages usually relate to perceived
4. See id. § 3-108(a)–(b) (2002) (defining “payable on demand” and “payable at a def-
inite time”).
5. See infra notes 130–40 and accompanying text.
6. A time note gives the borrower the right to the borrowed funds until maturity.
See U.C.C. § 3-108.
7. See HEMMENDINGER, supra note 1, § 9:11; George A. Nation III, Recognition and
Enforcement of Demandable Notes, 23 UCC L.J. 51 (1990) [hereinafter Nation,
Recognition] at 97–100.
8. See HEMMENDINGER, supra note 1, § 9:11; Nation, Recognition, supra note 7 at
97–100.
9. HEMMENDINGER, supra note 1, § 9:11; Nation, Recognition, supra note 7 at
99–100.
10. See HEMMENDINGER, supra note 1, § 9:11.
11. See U.C.C. § 3-108; George A. Nation III, Prepayment Fees in Commercial Prom-
issory Notes: Applicability to Payments Made Because of Acceleration, 72 TENN. L.
REV. 613, 624 (2005) [hereinafter Nation, Prepayment] (“Thus, holders of time
notes must wait for either the payment date provided for in the note or the occur-
rence of an event of default before they have a right to repayment of the note.
The holder of a time note does not have the right to decide unilaterally to acceler-
ate the note; the occurrence of an event of default is either beyond the holder’s
direct control or must be an event that would give rise to a good faith belief that
the prospect of payment has been impaired.  It is important to note that the oc-
currence of an event of default may also be beyond the borrower’s control.” (foot-
note omitted)).
12. See generally George A. Nation III, Commercial Loans Payable on Demand: Poor
Note Drafting Continues to Cause Problems for Lenders, 116 BANKING L.J. 313,
320–21 (1999) [hereinafter Nation, Commercial] (“Many of a lender’s most impor-
tant remedies, such as set-off and foreclosure, are only available after the loan
becomes due and payable.  Thus, lenders often desire as much flexibility as possi-
ble to make the loan due and payable.  As discussed, if the loan is documented
with a time note, the only way to make it due and payable early is to accelerate
the note.  However, a prudent lender should only accelerate a loan if it is con-
vinced that it can demonstrate that it reasonably believed that the repayment of
the loan was in jeopardy.  Some lenders believe that the burden of establishing to
a jury, in the context of a lender liability law suit, that the lender reasonably
believed that repayment of the loan was in jeopardy, is a significant burden.  For
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enforcement flexibility;13 that is, many lenders believe, sometimes in-
correctly, that if they use a demand note to document the loan they
not only have the right to demand payment at any time, but they also
have the right to receive repayment of the loan as soon as they de-
mand payment.14  Borrowers, on the other hand, may interpret the
“payable on demand” language as similar to an acceleration clause;
that is, some borrowers may believe, sometimes incorrectly, that the
lender will demand payment only if the borrower’s credit worthiness
declines.15
Article 3 was substantially revised in 1990,16 and some minor revi-
sions were made in 2002.17  The 1990 revisions, inter alia, clarified in
some respects the treatment of demand notes, however the revisions
also created some confusion as to the difference between time and de-
mand notes.18  The purpose of this Article is to discuss the proper way
to balance freedom of contract and good faith when demand notes are
used in the commercial lending context.  In other words, how should
courts accommodate the different interpretations that lenders and
borrowers often have of demand notes?
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Reger Case
A good illustration of the use of a demand note by a commercial
lender and the potential problems associated with such use can be
found in the case of Reger Development, LLC v. National City Bank,19
which was decided by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in 2010.
Reger Development, an Illinois LLC, was involved in real estate devel-
opment and Kevin Reger was Reger Development’s principal and sole
member.20  In June 2007, Reger and National City Bank (“National
City”) entered into discussions concerning the possibility of a loan
lenders who wish to avoid this burden, time notes are not acceptable.” (footnotes
omitted)).
13. Id.
14. Some courts have held, based on the legal fiction that demand notes are mature
from the moment of their execution, that a pure/traditional demand note (not a
demandable note) can be collected at any moment by the holder. See discussion
infra at notes 68, 85 and accompanying text.
15. See Nation, Recognition, supra note 7, at 86–87 nn.136–39 (discussing cases
where borrowers alleged lenders could not demand payment unless a default
occurred).
16. See UCC Article 3, in SELECTED COMMERCIAL STATUTES 228, 228 (West Academic
Publishing 2013) (“Article 3 was revised in 1990 and amended in 2002.”).
17. Id.
18. See U.C.C. § 3-108(c) (2002) (a new provision specifically defining demandable
notes, which is discussed infra at notes 141–61 and accompanying text).
19. 592 F.3d 759 (7th Cir. 2010).
20. Id.
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from the bank to Reger for the purpose of financing potential develop-
ment opportunities.21  National City had lent funds to Reger Develop-
ment for similar purposes on a number of previous occasions.22  That
is, the parties had an established course of dealing.23  Kevin Reger
met with National City’s representative to discuss the loan and asked
about changing the terms of form documents that had been suggested
by the bank to document the proposed line of credit.24  The suggested
form documents purported to create a demand obligation.25  Kevin
Reger was told that the form documents presented by National City
were nonnegotiable.26  Kevin Reger, on behalf of Reger Development,
executed the form documents, which consisted of a promissory note
and a commercial personal guarantee signed by Kevin Reger in his
individual capacity, guaranteeing the debt of Reger Development.27
Reger Development also paid a $5,000 closing fee for the line of
credit.28  The promissory note provided that Reger will pay “on de-
mand” the principal amount of the loan.  Interest payments were to be
made monthly based on the outstanding principal amount.29  In addi-
tion, the note provided the following: “Payment: Borrower will pay
this loan in full immediately upon Lender’s demand.”30  However, the
note also provided:
Notwithstanding any other provisions set forth in this Note, if (a) any princi-
pal owing under this note remains unpaid after Lender shall have given Bor-
rower notice of demand for payment thereof or after the commencement of any
proceeding under any bankruptcy or insolvency laws by or against Borrower
or (b) any accrued interest under this note remains unpaid after the due date
of that Interest, then, and in each such case, all unpaid principal of this Note
shall bear Interest at a rate equal to three percent (3%) per annum above the
rate that would otherwise be applicable.31
Also, notwithstanding the $5,000 closing fee paid by Reger Develop-
ment, the note stated in bold the following: “NO COMMIT-
MENT . . . NOTWITHSTANDING ANY PROVISION OR
INFERENCE TO THE CONTRARY, LENDER SHALL HAVE NO OB-
LIGATION TO EXTEND ANY CREDIT TO OR FOR THE ACCOUNT
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See U.C.C. § 1-303 (2001) (defining “course of dealing” as “a sequence of conduct
concerning previous transactions between the parties to a particular transaction
that is fairly to be regarded a establishing a common basis of understanding for
interpreting their expressions and other conduct.”).




28. Id. at 763.
29. Id. at 762.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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OF BORROWER BY REASON OF THIS NOTE.”32  The note also in-
cluded an integration clause, stating that the documents were the
complete agreement between the parties.33
In June 2008, a year after the documents were executed, the bank
requested updated personal financial statements and tax returns,
which the note gave the bank the right to request.34  The borrower
provided the requested documents.35  On August 19, 2008, notwith-
standing the fact that Reger Development was in full compliance with
all of the terms of the loan documents, including being fully up-to-date
in the payment of all interest charges due, National City asked the
company to pay down $125,000 of the principle of the line of credit,
which the borrower did the next business day.36  On September 9,
2008, at which time Reger Development continued to be in full compli-
ance with all of its obligations under the loan documents, National
City requested that “Reger Development ‘term out’ $300,000 of the
Note by having one of Kevin Reger’s other businesses agree to take out
a three-year loan in that amount secured by a second mortgage on
some real estate.”37  The bank also notified the borrower that it would
be reducing the amount of money available under the line of credit to
between $400,000–$500,000, down from the original $750,000.38  Ke-
vin Reger was surprised by the bank’s actions and requests and asked
if National City would call the line of credit if Reger Development did
not agree to the Bank’s “requests.”39  The bank acknowledged that
Reger Development was not in default but stated, “there is a possibil-
ity that we may demand payment of the line.”40  Reger Development
then sued the bank, filing a complaint in Illinois state court accusing
National City of breaching the terms of the note.41  “The company also
alleged that National City used the form promissory note contracts to
perpetuate a fraudulent scheme in which the bank fooled people into
taking out loans by concealing the fact that the principal could be
called on demand.”42  The bank was headquartered in Cleveland,
Ohio, and removed the case to the Northern District of Illinois under
diversity jurisdiction.43  The bank successfully moved to dismiss the
complaint for failure to state a cause of action.44  The district court
32. Id.
33. Id.
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rejected Reger Development’s motion for reconsideration and Reger
Development appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.45
With regard to the breach of contract claim, Reger Development
alleged that National City breached the loan contract by arbitrarily
and capriciously demanding payment under the line of credit even
though Reger Development was in good standing and by unilaterally
changing, and attempting to change the fundamental terms of the con-
tract documents without Reger Development’s consent.46  In this con-
nection Reger Development identified several provisions in the note
that it claimed were “fundamentally inconsistent with the nature of a
demand instrument.”47  These provisions included a default interest
provision, a prepayment clause (that allowed Reger Development to
pay “all or a portion of the amount owed earlier than it is due”) and a
provision that granted National City the right to access Reger Devel-
opment’s financial information, which Reger Development character-
ized as a financial insecurity provision.48
As a result of these provisions, Reger Development argued that the
note, notwithstanding its payable-on-demand language, created an ob-
ligation that allowed National City to demand payment only if Reger
Development suffered some type of economic adversity.49  That is,
Reger claimed the note should be interpreted as a time note and the
demand provision should be interpreted as a type of acceleration
clause.50  Moreover, under this interpretation, Section 1-309 of Article
1 of the U.C.C.51 would apply to the note.52  U.C.C. Section 1-309 pro-
vides that a clause that says the holder may accelerate “at will” or
“when [it] deems itself insecure” or uses “words of similar import”
means that the holder has the right to do so only if it in good faith
believes that the prospect of payment or performance is impaired.53
Under Reger Development’s interpretation of the note, National City
could call the note—that is, demand payment/accelerate the note—
only if it believed in good faith that the prospect of payment or per-
formance was impaired.54  Thus, when National City threatened to
call the note and demanded a change in the terms of the line of credit
agreement, it breached the contract because it had no right to call the
45. Id.
46. Id. at 764.
47. Id. at 765.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 766.
51. Note that U.C.C. Section 1-309 was formerly Section 1-208.  Throughout the
course of this Article, any time [Section 1-309] appears within a citation or within
a direct quote in the body of the text, the original source or quote was referencing
prior Section 1-208.
52. See U.C.C. § 1-309 (2001).
53. Id.
54. Reger, 592 F.3d at 765.
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loan since Reger Development was not in default with respect to any
obligations under the documents and had not suffered any economi-
cally adverse event which would have led National City to believe in
good faith that the prospect of payment or performance had been
impaired.55
Reger Development also alleged fraud on the part of National
City.56  Reger Development essentially alleged that National City cre-
ated the impression that Reger Development would have the use of
the loan proceeds unless it suffered some type of economic adversity,
which would give National City the right to demand payment.57
Whether National City could have, upon appropriate notice, termi-
nated the lending relationship even if Reger Development had not suf-
fered any economically adverse event was not the focus of the case, but
is an important issue discussed infra.58  One of the most important
facts that led Reger Development to allege fraud was the payment of
the $5,000 closing fee.59  As Reger Development argued to the court,
no reasonable borrower would have paid $5,000 to enter into a line of
credit if the borrower had been clearly informed that the lender had
no obligation to fund the line and that if the line was funded, the
lender could demand and collect payment immediately.60  Reger De-
velopment argued that National City intentionally and fraudulently
created the impression that it had made a commitment to make a loan
rather than an illusory promise.  That promise, according to Reger De-
velopment, essentially required National City to do nothing in ex-
change for the payment of the closing fee.61  Reger Development was
under the impression—based on its payment of the $5,000 closing fee,
its obligation to provide financial information to be reviewed and ap-
proved by National City, its established course of dealing with Na-
tional City, and the signing of the loan documents—that it had
received a commitment from National City to make the loan, notwith-
standing the language in the note quoted above.62  Reger Develop-
ment might be forgiven for thinking so given that, for example as
noted supra, the U.C.C. provides that a note that declares it may be
accelerated “at will,” etc., really does not mean that at all; what it
means is that the holder may accelerate only if the holder believes in
good faith that the prospect of payment or performance has been im-
55. Id. at 766.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See infra notes 130–40 and accompanying text.
59. Reger, 592 F.3d at 767.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 766.
62. Id.
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paired.63  Moreover, both the U.C.C.64 and the common law65 impose
an obligation of good faith in the performance and enforcement of
every contract, and also prevent the enforcement of contracts based on
illusory promises.66  Thus, Reger Development, or any borrower,
might reasonably conclude that the bank at least had to act in good
faith in order to terminate or unilaterally modify the loan.67
B. The Problems Associated with Using Demand Notes in
Commercial Loans
The Reger case illustrates the crux of the matter, which is: How
should the law balance freedom of contract and good faith in the con-
text of a demand note given by a commercial borrower?  According to
many courts, when the magic legal words “payable on demand” appear
in a note, good faith is not relevant to the holder’s demand for pay-
ment of the note because the holder is not causing the note to mature
by demanding payment, but rather is merely demanding payment of
an obligation that technically is already mature.68  This reasoning is
based on the fact that courts have traditionally interpreted a pure/
63. See U.C.C. § 1-309 (2001) (discussed infra at notes 216–30 and accompanying
text).
64. See id. § 1-304 (“Every contract or duty within [the Uniform Commercial Code]
imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance and enforcement.”).
65. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981) (imposing a duty of good
faith between the parties to a contract).
66. Id. § 77 (stating illusory promises are unenforceable for lack of consideration).
67. See infra notes 216–30 and accompanying text.
68. See Nation, Recognition, supra note 7, at 55–56 (noting that since the holder of a
pure-traditional demand note takes no action to mature the note, “good faith is
not an issue as there is no duty or act to which the obligation of good faith could
be applied”); see, e.g., Fulton Nat’l Bank v. Willis Denney Ford, Inc., 269 S.E.2d
916 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980) (noting that a demand instrument is due immediately
after its execution and “[t]hus, the only ‘duty’ under the U.C.C. on a holder of a
demand instrument is to seek enforcement of the instrument which is on its face
‘immediately’ due and payable within the applicable statute of limitation”);
Centerre Bank v. Distrib., Inc., 705 S.W.2d 42, 47 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (noting
that a demand note is mature on its date of issue and that “[t]he good-faith re-
quirement of [Section 1-304] is in the performance or enforcement of a contract or
duty,” thus concluding that [Section 1-304] “has no application because it does
not relate to the performance or enforcement of any right under the demand
note. . . ”); Allied Sheet Metal Fabricators, Inc. v. Peoples Nat’l Bank, 518 P.2d
734 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974); see also Glen D. West & Michael P. Haggerty, The
“Demandable” Note and the Obligation of Good Faith, 21 UCC L.J. 99, 118 (1988)
(discussing how courts considering this issue readily determine that no concept of
good faith should apply). But see, Julian B. McDonnell, Problems with Notes: Ac-
crual, Acceleration, and Suretyship, 18 UCC L.J. 40, 41–42 (1985) (suggesting
that the obligation of good faith be applied to demand notes “but, unfortunately,
the rule [stated in U.C.C. Section 3-122 (1)(b), that a demand note is due and
payable upon its date or, if no date is stated, on the date of issue] is applied in
other contexts [than the statute of limitations].  Thus, there are cases under the
code indicating that the holder may sue, foreclose, or set off as against the maker
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traditional demand note as becoming due immediately upon its execu-
tion by the maker.69  Under this interpretation, the holder does not
exercise any discretion in calling for payment of a demand note be-
cause the note is already due and payable.70  The policy of fairness
and commercial reasonableness that underlies Section 1-309’s recogni-
tion that there should be a limitation on the holder/lender’s ability to
exercise its discretion in a way that obviously and predictably disad-
vantages the borrower does not apply to a demand note under this
traditional interpretation.  This is so because the holder exercises no
discretion in making the note due and payable, since the note became
due as soon as it was signed.71  However, from the perspective of the
borrower there is no difference at all between a demand for payment
and acceleration.72  A similar issue, also illustrated by Reger, concerns
how courts should interpret contract language that states, as the note
did in Reger, the lender has no obligation to lend any money.73  Is this
language sufficient to overcome a compelling conclusion to the con-
trary created by the nature of commercial loans, the payment of vari-
ous fees to the lender, repayment schedules, default interest rates, the
before demanding payment and that the decision of such a holder to press his
claim is not subject to good-faith restraints” (footnotes omitted)).
69. See infra notes 85–129 and accompanying text.
70. See supra note 68.
71. See supra note 68.
72. From the maker’s perspective, regardless of whether the precipitating event is
acceleration or demand, he must pay the note.  Moreover, while under the tradi-
tional legal interpretation of a pure/traditional demand note the holder does
nothing to mature the note, practically, the holder does make a decision to, and
does take action to enforce the note; in fact, if the holder did not, a demand note
might never be paid. See U.C.C. § 3-118, cmt. 2 (2002) (“Although a note payable
on demand could theoretically be called a day after it was issued, the normal
expectation of the parties is that the note will remain outstanding until there is
some reason to call it.”).  Thus, making the decision to enforce, as well as taking
enforcement action, might be considered a duty of the holder of a demand note
and U.C.C. Section 1-304 might be interpreted as imposing an obligation of good
faith on the holder of a demand note. Cf. Bank of Nev. v. United States, 251 F.2d
820 (9th Cir. 1958) (“Although the maker of a demand note is not in default until
he refused payment until after demand therefor, it is generally held that a note
payable on demand is due immediately, so that suit may be maintained on it at
any time after delivery. . . . ” (quoting 10 C.J.S. Bills and Notes § 247(b), at 744
(1938))). See U.C.C. § 3-304 (2002) (stating a demand instrument is overdue, at
the earliest, the day after the day demand for payment is duly made).  If this
interpretation were adopted, good faith would be applied to demand notes in the
same general way that it is to demandable notes. See infra notes 216–30 and
accompanying text.  One obvious difference would be that, because of the nature
of the transactions where a demand note would logically be used, the time be-
tween demand and maturity would be generally shorter than in the case of a
demandable note.
73. See Reger Dev. v. Nat’l City Bank, 592 F.3d 759, 762 (7th Cir. 2010).
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credit approval process, etc.?74  How are the courts, borrowers and
borrowers’ counsel to harmonize these competing viewpoints when
even the U.C.C. seems to confuse the issue?75  For example, Section 3-
108(a) provides that a promise or order is payable on demand if it
states that it is “payable on demand or sight, or otherwise indicates
that it is payable at the will of the holder,” while Section 1-309 pro-
vides that the term providing that a party may accelerate payment at
will means that the party has the power to do so only if that party in
good faith believes the prospect of payment performance is im-
paired.76  The Official Comment to Section 1-309 states that this sec-
tion does not apply “to demand instruments or obligations whose very
nature permits call at anytime with or without reason,” rather it “ap-
plies only to an obligation of payment which in the first instance is due
at a future date.”77 But why not simply interpret a time note with an
“at will” acceleration clause as a demand note under Section 3-108(a)?
Why is a time note with an “at will” acceleration clause deemed to be
payable in the first instance at a future date, but a note that provides
for payment “at the will of the holder” is deemed a demand note?78
Moreover, U.C.C. Section 3-117 recognizes that the obligation of a
party to an instrument to pay the instrument may be “modified, sup-
plemented, or nullified by a separate agreement of the obligor and a
person entitled to enforce the instrument, if the instrument is issued
or the obligation is incurred in reliance on the agreement or as part of
the same transaction giving rise to the agreement.”79  Section 1-
201(b)(3) defines “agreement,” as distinguished from “contract,” as the
“bargain of the parties in fact, as found in their language or inferred
from other circumstances, including course of performance, course of
dealing, or usage of trade.”80  Thus, the agreement between the bor-
rower and the lender as determined by the nature of commercial lend-
ing, the prior course of dealing between the parties, the borrowers
planned use of the loan proceeds, as well as the specific provisions of
74. See e.g., Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214, 214–15 (1917) (“A prom-
ise may be lacking, and yet the whole writing may be ‘instinct with an obligation,’
imperfectly expressed.  If this is so there is a contract. . . .  The acceptance of the
exclusive agency was an assumption of its duties.  We are not to suppose that one
party was to be placed at the mercy of the other. . . .  Without an implied prom-
ise, the transaction cannot have such business ‘efficacy as both parties must have
intended that at all events it should have.” (citations omitted)). See discussion
infra at notes 178–215 and accompanying text.
75. See infra notes 141–61 and accompanying text.
76. See U.C.C. § 3-108(a) (2002); id. § 1-309 (2001).
77. Id. § 1-309, cmt. 1.
78. See discussion infra at notes 141–61 and accompanying text.
79. U.C.C. § 3-117 (2002).
80. Id. § 1-201(b)(3) (2001).
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the note and the other loan documents may be used to determine the
obligation of the maker/borrower to the holder/lender.81
Interestingly, the Seventh Circuit’s opinion states that the main
question in Reger is whether the note entitles National City to de-
mand payment from Reger Development at will.82  But answering
that question doesn’t solve the real dilemma, which is: Should Na-
tional City’s exercise of discretion in setting the repayment terms of
the loan, especially the due date, be subject to a general obligation of
good faith?83  That is, how should we accommodate freedom of con-
tract, and the general obligation to act in good faith in the perform-
ance or enforcement of a contract, in context of the enforcement of a
demand promissory note documenting a commercial loan?84
III. ANALYSIS
A. Old and Continuing Problems
Demand notes have always been somewhat ambiguous.  Even
though these notes state that they are payable “on demand,” early
courts decided that no demand other than the bringing of a lawsuit
was necessary in order for the holder to maintain an action on the
note.85  Subsequent courts ruled that no actual demand or commence-
ment of legal action was necessary in order to receive payment on a
demand note, erroneously citing the earlier decisions that held com-
mencement of the law suit constituted sufficient demand.86  Eventu-
ally, the rule developed that a demand note, notwithstanding its
express statement that it is “payable on demand,” is in fact a mature
81. Id.
82. Reger Dev. v. Nat’l City Bank, 592 F.3d 759, 762 (7th Cir. 2010).
83. See infra notes 216–30 and accompanying text.
84. See infra notes 178–215 and accompanying text.
85. By the early 1700s, the basic rule had developed that no demand other than the
action brought was necessary to enforce payment of a demand note. See J.
MILNES HOLDEN, THE HISTORY OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS IN ENGLISH LAW 109
(1955).  The action itself was deemed sufficient demand to make the note due and
payable. Id.
86. Ironically, subsequent courts developed the rule that demand notes were mature
from the moment of their execution without either the bringing of a lawsuit or a
prior demand by the holder. See, e.g., Spencer Cos. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 81
B.R. 194, 198 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987) (“Generally, demand notes are considered
due and payable immediately upon their execution with or without a prior de-
mand.”); Jenkins v. Karlton, 620 A.2d 894, 897 (Md. 1993) (“[I]t has long been
well settled that demand notes are payable immediately, without demand.”);
Shawmut Bank, N.A. v. Miller, 614 N.E.2d 668, 669 (Mass. 1993) (“[I]t is the
general rule that a note unconditionally payable on demand is payable immedi-
ately without demand.”); Allied Sheet Metal Fabricators, Inc. v. Peoples Nat’l
Bank, 518 P.2d 734, 738 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (“It is elementary that a demand
note is payable immediately on the date of its execution.”).
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note due and payable from the moment of its execution.87  As a result,
the name “demand” note is itself misleading.88  A better name for a
demand note, at least based on the traditional analysis, is “mature
note.”89  In addition, even though Article 3 technically provides for
presentment and demand for payment of notes, these requirements
are virtually always waived with regard to notes used in commercial
lending.90  This anomalous and ambiguous treatment of demand notes
has led to a number of problems, as illustrated by Reger, with the en-
87. In fact, it would seem that a note payable “on demand” should, on the basis of
logic, the plain meaning of the language used, and general business practice (in-
deed based on all but legal precedent), require an actual demand for payment and
a breach of the obligation to pay as prerequisites to enforcement.
88. See, e.g., Shawmut, 614 N.E.2d at 669 (“The label ‘demand note’ can be somewhat
misleading [and] a sort of tolerated mislabeling . . . .”); Shapleigh Hardware Co. v.
Spiro, 106 So. 209, 210 (Miss. 1925) (noting that the general interpretation of
demand notes is “subject to the just criticism that it makes the provision that the
instrument shall be payable on demand mean the opposite of what the language
indicates”); WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND & LARRY LARENCE, HAWKLAND UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE SERIES § 3-122:3 (2002) (“Since there is no requirement that the
holder make demand before commencing an action, the name ‘demand’ instru-
ment is a misnomer.”).  The application of the rule that a demand note is mature
at the moment of its execution should be confined to the context for which the
rule was designed—the statute of limitations. See Palmer v. Palmer, 36 Mich.
487, 491 (1877) (“If the judgment [of the lower court] is correct, it can only be so
because, by the terms of the contract the holder had a right to postpone the ma-
turity of the debt as long as he chose to do so.  For if the debt did not become
payable until fixed by demand, and the demand was optional with the creditor,
no tender could be made which would bind him, and he could keep the debt alive
in spite of the debtor, for an indefinite period.  If there was an infirmity in the
consideration, or any defect in the binding character of the obligation, he might
retain it until all testimony was lost, and defeat the defense.  This is the mischief
which the statutes of limitation were intended to remedy.”). See West and Hag-
gerty, supra note 68, at 108–09 (discussing Palmer).  Other courts that have held
U.C.C. Section 1-304 does not apply to demand notes have cited with approval
the notion that Section 1-304 cannot be applied to override the express terms of a
contract. See, e.g., Flagship Nat’l Bank v. Gray Distrib. Sys., Inc., 485 So. 2d
1336 (Fla. Ct. App. 1986).  This analysis disregards the plain language of Section
1-304, which refers to “every contract or duty” and violates the plain language of
Section 1-302, which prohibits the elimination of the obligation of good faith even
by agreement of the parties. U.C.C. § 3-304 (2002) (emphasis added); id. § 1-302
(2001).
89. See supra note 88.
90. See U.C.C. § 3-501 (2002); id. § 3-502 (2002) (providing for presentment and dis-
honor).  The Official Comment to U.C.C. Section 3-502 states, “In the great ma-
jority of cases presentment and notice of dishonor are waived with respect to
notes.” Id. § 3-502, cmt. 2.  Also, Section 3-502(a)(1) provides that a note payable
on demand is dishonored if presentment is duly made to the maker and the note
is not paid on the day of presentment. Id. (emphasis added).  However, U.C.C.
Section 3-501 provides that the maker may refuse payment for failure of the pre-
sentment to comply with the terms of the instrument, an agreement of the par-
ties, or other applicable law or rule. Id. § 3-501(b)(3) (emphasis added).
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forcement of demand notes especially in the commercial lending
context.91
Moreover, further ambiguities surrounding the distinction be-
tween time and demand notes resulted from the definitions contained
in Prior Article 3.  Prior Article 3 provided that an instrument was
“payable at a definite time if by its terms it [was] payable on or before
a stated date or at a . . . definite time subject to acceleration.”92  In-
struments payable on demand were defined as instruments payable at
sight or on presentation and those in which no time for payment was
stated.93  These definitions resulted in a number of potential problems
when a demand note was used to document a commercial loan.  For
example, should a note that provides that it is payable on demand, but
if no demand is sooner made then in installments on specific dates, be
interpreted as a time or demand note?94  This note does not seem to fit
the earlier definition of a demand note because it contains specific re-
payment dates.95  On the other hand, the note does state that it is
payable on demand.96  Other provisions such as default interest rates,
late charges, acceleration clauses, and prepayment provisions all have
created problems.97  All of these provisions, which are extremely com-
91. See, e.g., M.S.V., Inc. v. Bank of Bos., 87 B.R. 752 (D. Mass. 1988) (regarding
foreclosure on collateral pursuant to a demand type instrument); Spencer Cos. V.
Chase Manhattan Bank, 81 B.R. 194, 198 (D. Mass. 1987) (regarding set off and
demand type notes); Stebens v. Wilkinson, 87 N.W.2d 16 (Iowa 1957) (regarding
the running of the statute of limitation and demand type notes); Merrimack River
Sav. Bank v. Higgins, 195 A. 369 (N.H. 1937) (regarding foreclosure on collateral
pursuant to a demand type instrument); Allied Sheet Metal Fabricators, Inc. v.
People’s Nat’l Bank, 518 P.2d 734, 738 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (regarding set off
and demand type notes).
92. PRIOR UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-109(1) (1990).
93. Id. § 3-108 (1990).
94. See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. Mark Twain State Bank, 715 S.W.2d 944, 950–51 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1986) (holding a note provided for payment “On demand but if no de-
mand is made then . . . . ” was not a demand note, but rather implied to be a time
note because the requirement of an actual demand meant that the parties did not
intend the note to be due when executed); Reese v. First Mo. Bank & Trust Co.,
664 S.W.2d 530, 531 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (holding a note providing for payment
“On demand but if no demand be made then . . . .” was a time note because the
requirement of an actual demand indicated that the parties did not intend the
note to mature upon issue); cf. Todd v. Third Nat’l Bank, 113 S.W.2d 740 (Tenn.
1938) (holding that a note stating it was payable on demand but also providing
for periodic interest payments was a demand note because there was no indica-
tion the parties did not intend the note to mature upon issue); Nation, Recogni-
tion, supra note 7, at 65–76 (discussing this issue).  Revised U.C.C. Article 3 has
resolved this issue and such instruments are demand instruments. See U.C.C.
§ 3-108(c).
95. See supra notes 92–94.
96. See supra notes 92–94.
97. See Nation, Recognition, supra note 7, at 86–88 (discussing the fact that the
courts that treat notes providing for payment on demand, but including specific
repayment dates, as time notes do so in part because of references to maturity, an
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mon in the commercial lending context, are inconsistent with an obli-
gation that is already due and payable; remember many courts
interpret demand notes to be due and payable from the moment they
are signed.98  If a demand note is always past due, how can there be a
default interest rate that is higher than the stated interest rate when
technically a demand note is always in default?99  How can late
charges apply when payment on a demand note is always made after
maturity?100  What is the point of telling the maker of a demand note
that he may prepay the note without penalty?  Under the traditional
legal theory of demand notes, the maker can undoubtedly prepay
without a penalty because the note is already mature.101  Worse
would be a demand note that tells the maker he cannot prepay the
note without penalty.  Obviously, under the traditional legal theory of
demand notes, such a provision makes no sense.  And, of course, an
acceleration clause also makes absolutely no sense in a demand note
because it is not possible to accelerate a due date that has already
arrived.102
Finally, these earlier definitions of time and demand notes also led
to confusion concerning the application of the obligation of good faith
contained in former Section 1-208 (current Section 1-309) mentioned
supra.103  In the commercial lending context borrowers usually plan
an illiquid use of the loan proceeds.104  As a result, a time note would
make the most sense.105  That is, if everything goes as planned, the
borrower would be able to repay the principal and interest over time
as the borrower received revenue from its use of the loan proceeds.106
However, the possibility that things will not go as planned puts the
increased interest rate after maturity, statements that failure to pay at maturity
constitute an event of default, or any such combination).  Any reference inconsis-
tent with an obligation due on issue may create a problem.
98. See supra note 85.
99. Note that Revised Article 3 provides a demand instrument is “overdue at the
earliest . . . the day after the demand for payment is duly made.” U.C.C. § 3-304
(2002).  Does “after default” mean the same thing as “overdue?”  It may not under
the traditional reasoning that no demand need be made by the holder of a pure/
traditional demand note, and thus reference to default is inconsistent with a pure
demand note.
100. See supra text accompanying note 85.
101. See Nation, Prepayment, supra note 11, at 625 (stating no prepayment fee would
be owed for prepayment of a demand note).
102. See supra note 85.
103. See supra notes 75–78 and accompanying text.
104. See Nation, Commercial, supra note 12, at 322; George A. Nation III, Demand
Notes and Good Faith in Commercial Lending: The Impact of Revised Article 3, 27
UCC L.J. 382, 392 (1995) [hereinafter Nation, Demand Notes].
105. A time note gives the borrow assurance that it will have the use of the funds until
maturity unless its credit worthiness declines or it allows a default to occur. See
U.C.C. § 3-188(b) (2002).
106. Id.
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lender in a risky situation.  If the borrower suffers economic difficulty
the lender may have trouble recovering its loan.107  Moreover, the
longer the lender waits to take action the worse the situation is likely
to become from the lender’s perspective.108  Therefore, it is very im-
portant to the lender that it can move quickly to recover its loan if the
borrower’s economic situation deteriorates.109  This is the reason that
acceleration clauses are so important and so common.110  Without one,
a lender who has used a time note providing for installment payments
would have to sue for each missed installment.111  An acceleration
clause allows the lender to bring one lawsuit and recover the entire
principal and all earned interest in one action.112  As a way to further
reduce risk, lenders typically condition their right to accelerate upon
the occurrence of an “event of default,” which is a defined term in ei-
ther the note or the loan agreement and often other loan docu-
ments.113  At a minimum an “event of default” is defined to include a
missed payment of principal or interest, but the definition typically
includes much more than that.114  In fact, any event that would indi-
cate a deterioration of the borrower’s financial position is usually de-
fined as an event of default.115  Moreover, rather than relying on a
specific definition of every event which could result in the deteriora-
tion of the borrower’s financial position, most lenders also include
some very broad, generic language to cover anything they might have
forgotten or overlooked.116  For example, typically the event of default
definition includes the occurrence of any “material adverse change” in
the borrower’s financial position.117  Broader still is the inclusion of a
provision that allows the lender to accelerate payment “at will” or
“whenever the lender deems itself insecure.”118
As noted supra, the U.C.C. has placed a specific good-faith limita-
tion on the latter type of provisions.119  That is, the lender may only
use these broad, generic provisions to accelerate the loan if the lender
in good faith believes that the prospect of payment or performance has
107. See Nation, Recognition, supra note 7, at 57–61.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.; see also, HEMMENDINGER, supra note 1, § 9:11.
111. See sources cited supra notes 107–10.
112. See sources cited supra notes 107–10.
113. See HEMMENDINGER, supra note 1, § 9:11; Nation, Recognition, supra note 7, at
99–100.
114. See HEMMENDINGER, supra note 1, § 9:11; Nation, Recognition, supra note 7, at
99–100.
115. See HEMMENDINGER, supra note 1, § 9:11; Nation, Recognition, supra note 7, at
99–100.
116. See Nation, Demand Notes, supra note 104, at 385–86.
117. Id. at 386.
118. Id.
119. See supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text (discussing U.C.C. Section 1-309).
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become impaired.120  However, this limitation did not, and under the
revised Article 1 does not, apply to a demand note.121  But does this
limitation apply to a note that provides it is payable on demand, but if
demand is not sooner made it is then payable in installments?122  If
such a note were interpreted as a time note, then the demand provi-
sion would be a type of acceleration clause to which the specific good-
faith limitation would apply.123  There has been significant litigation
concerning these issues.124  In response, some courts and commenta-
tors have categorized demand notes as either “demandable” or “pure/
traditional demand” notes.125  The distinction is that a demandable
note requires an actual demand in order to become mature, while a
pure/traditional demand note does not.126  For example, a note like
the one mentioned above, providing that it is “payable on demand but
if demand is not sooner made it is then payable in installments,” has
been treated by some courts as demandable.127  Such a note, unlike a
120. Id.
121. Id. (discussing the Official Comment to U.C.C. Section 1-209 and noting that sec-
tion does not apply to demand notes).
122. Under former Article 3 it was not clear how such notes should be treated. See
PRIOR U.C.C. § 3-108 (1990); id. § 3-109 (discussed supra at notes 92–93 and ac-
companying text).
123. See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. Mark Twain State Bank, 715 S.W.2d 944, 950–51 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1986) (holding a note providing for payment “On demand but if no de-
mand is made then . . . . ” was not a demand note, but rather impliedly a time
note, because the requirement of an actual demand meant that the parties did
not intend the note to be due when executed); Reese v. First Mo. Bank & Trust
Co., 664 S.W.2d 530 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (holding a note providing for payment
“On demand but if no demand be made then . . . .” was a time note because the
requirement of an actual demand indicated that the parties did not intend the
note to mature upon issue); Todd v. Third Nat’l Bank, 113 S.W.2d 740 (Tenn.
1938) (holding that a note stating it was payable on demand, but also providing
for periodic interest payments was a demand note because there was no indica-
tion the parties did not intend the note to mature upon issue); see also Nation,
Demand Notes, supra note 104, at 384–90 (citing cases where courts felt con-
strained to interpret ambiguous notes as either time or demand notes instead of
adopting the demandable note option).
124. See supra note 123.
125. See generally Carolyn M. Edwards, Article 3 Demand Notes and the Doctrine of
Good Faith, 74 MARQ. L. REV. 481 (1991) (discussing the holder of a notes’ ability
to call for payment at any time, with or without reason, sometimes in bad faith);
Nation, Demand Notes, supra note 104 (distinguishing demand notes from de-
mandable notes); Nation, Recognition, supra note 7 (arguing that demandable
notes are unique from time notes and demand notes); West & Haggerty, supra
note 68 (considering the implications of a “demandable note” on the statute of
limitations and the requirement of good faith).
126. See Nation, Demand Notes, supra note 104, at 389.
127. See, e.g., Exch. Nat’l Bank v. Crest Fin. Co., 203 N.E.2d 58, 60 (Ill. Ct. App. 1964)
(citing Brown, infra, and stating, “The note in the instant case, like the note in
the Brown case, could be matured prior to its due date by the making of a demand
upon the maker” where the note stated, “[o]n Demand, and if no demand is made
then 91 days after date”); Brown v. Maguire’s Real Est. Agency, 101 S.W.2d 41,
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pure/traditional demand note, is not mature from execution, but re-
quires an actual demand by the holder to become mature.128  Moreo-
ver, since the holder exercises discretion in making an actual demand
for payment and in setting repayment terms, the general obligation to
act in good faith may be applied to the holder’s exercise of this
discretion.129
B. Recognition of Demandable Notes: A Step Toward a
Solution
Recognizing the distinction between pure/traditional demand notes
and demandable notes is crucial to finding a solution to the problems
associated with the use of demand notes in commercial lending.130
Distinguishing between demand, demandable, and time notes is very
important in order to protect the reasonable expectations of the
lender/holder and the borrower/maker.131  That is, it allows courts to
49 (Mo. Ct. App. 1937), rev’d on other grounds, 121 S.W.2d 754 (Mo. 1938) (stat-
ing “[w]e think the intent of the note is that it does not mature, so that an action
may be maintained upon it, prior to February 1, 1933, without demand for its
payment first having been made” where the note provided that “[o]n demand and
if no demand be made, then on the 1st day of February, 1933” (emphasis added)).
For a more recent statement of the same rule, see Spencer Cos. v. Chase Manhat-
tan Bank, 81 B.R. 194, 198 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987) (“Although formal demand is
not required to mature an obligation evidenced by a demand note, the parties to a
lending arrangement can agree that a note will become due and payable only
after a formal demand is made.  Moreover, the mere fact that the parties choose
to label the instruments which evidence their obligations as demand notes does
not automatically mean that no prior demand is required.  Where the terms and
conditions of a so-called demand note indicate that the parties intended the obli-
gation to become due and payable upon the happening of a future event, the debt
is not mature upon execution of the note.  The obligation matures only when the
agreed-upon event occurs.” (citations omitted)).
128. See supra notes 85, 127.
129. See sources cited supra note 68.
130. See supra note 125.
131. By characterizing a note as demandable, the lender’s/holder’s right to call the
loan at any time and for any reason—that is, the holder may start the clock run-
ning on the borrower’s reasonable time to refinance at any time the holder
chooses—is preserved and the borrower/maker is treated fairly because he is
given a reasonable time to arrange refinancing before he is in default under a
demandable note.  The requirement that the holder/lender of the demandable
note give the borrower a reasonable time to arrange refinancing comports with
general commercial practice.  Most lenders, as a matter of policy, give the maker
some notice of their desire to terminate the financial relationship prior to actu-
ally requiring repayment, unless doing so would jeopardize repayment of the
loan.  During this notice period the maker often, with the help of the holder,
seeks alternate financing. See, e.g., Bank One, Tex. v. Taylor, 970 F.2d 16, 32
(5th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he former president of MBank, Ed Evans, testified at trial
that the bank could not simply demand payment on an ‘unreasonable basis,’ but
was obligated to consider, in good faith, all the facts and circumstances before
accelerating the note.”); K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 759–61 (6th
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avoid treating a demandable note as a time note and then applying
the specific Section 1-309 good faith obligation to the holder’s decision
to demand payment.132  Such an interpretation is in error because it
misses the fundamental distinction between time and demand (pure/
traditional demand notes and demandable notes) obligations.133  A de-
mand obligation—whether pure/traditional or demandable—allows
the holder/lender to decide to demand payment at any time and for
any reason and the obligation to act in good faith does not apply to the
holder’s decision to demand payment because the fundamental nature
of a demand obligation is that it allows the holder to decide to demand
payment at any time for any reason.134  However, as discussed infra,
this does not mean that every demand obligation becomes due and
Cir. 1985) (“Logically, at such time as Irving might wish to curtail financing
K.M.C., as was its right under the agreement, this obligation to act in good faith
would require a period of notice to K.M.C. [maker] to allow it a reasonable oppor-
tunity to seek alternate financing, absent valid business reasons precluding Ir-
ving from doing so. . . .  James Kuharski was executive vice president and
manager of secured lending activities for Irving [Trust], and two levels above
Sarokin [loan officer] in Irving’s management hierarchy.  Kuharski acknowledged
that Irving owed its clients [borrowers] a duty of good faith, that it was not a
policy of Irving to terminate financing without notice, and that if Sarokin believed
that Irving was adequately secured he would not have been acting in accordance
with that duty of good faith to have refused without notice to advance funds to
K.M.C. [borrower].” (emphasis added)).  Obviously, this notice period is not given
if the lender’s desire to terminate the financial relationship is due to a good faith
belief that the prospect of payment or performance has become impaired.  But if
this is the case, the termination is more in the nature of an acceleration, not the
result of the use of the demand provision that is included to allow the lender to
mature the note for internal reasons. See Rogers v. Sec. Bank, 658 F.2d 638 (8th
Cir. 1981) (involving a case where the bank made demand but gave maker time to
pay; no enforcement action taken); Taggart & Taggart Seed, Inc. v. First Tenn.
Bank N.A., 684 F. Supp 230 (E.D. Ark. 1988) (involving a case where the bank
made demand in 1984 and extended the repayment date until April 1986); Peter-
son v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 432 P.2d 446 (Sup. Ct. Ariz. 1967) (involving a case
where the bank demanded payment giving maker sixty days to pay).
132. See supra notes 94, 123 (discussing courts that held demandable notes to be time
notes because their provisions did not adhere to the definition of a demand note
as being due on issue); Spencer Cos., 81 B.R. at 198; see also Nation, Recognition,
supra note 7, at 84 (noting that many courts have felt compelled to construe notes
as either time notes or demand notes and citing cases).  However, when the par-
ties intend to create a demandable obligation, the application of either a time
note or demand note interpretation by the court interferes with the reasonable
expectations of the parties.
133. See Nation, Demand Notes, supra note 104, at 387–88 (“The holder of a demand
or demandable note does not have to wait for an event of default to demand pay-
ment.”); Nation, Recognition, supra note 7, at 61–65 (“Holders of both demand-
able and demand notes can unilaterally determine the time for payment.”).
134. Nation, Recognition, supra note 7, at 77 (“The holder’s [of a demandable note]
right to demand payment should not be burdened with a good-faith obligation.”);
Nation, Demand Notes, supra note 104, at 395–96 (“The holder of a demand or
demandable note can demand payment of the note at any time for any rea-
son . . . and is not subject to act in good faith.”).
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payable immediately upon the holder’s demand for payment.135  More-
over, it also does not mean that the general obligation of good faith
(formerly found in Section 1-203, and now in Section 1-304) does not
apply to the aspects of the holder’s demand for payment other than his
decision of when to make the demand.136  That is, the general obliga-
tion of good faith does apply to both the way in which the holder com-
municates the demand and, importantly, to the holder’s setting of the
repayment date applicable to the demand.137  However, while the rec-
ognition of demandable notes better reflects the commercial lending
situation, problems still persist.138  In addition, while the revisions to
Article 3 provide some clarification, they also provide new ambigu-
ity.139  The difficulty is trying to balance the nature of commercial
lending and the likely understanding between the borrower and the
loan officer with the drafting of the lender’s lawyers.140
135. See infra notes 162–78 and accompanying text.
136. See Nation, Recognition, supra note 7, at 78–80 (concluding that the general good
faith obligation under [Section 1-309] should apply to both the setting of the
amount of time the maker has to respond to the demand before the note is in
default, and to the making of the demand for payment).
137. See infra notes 162–78 and accompanying text.
138. See, e.g., Reger Dev. v. Nat’l City Bank, 592 F.3d 759 (7th Cir. 2010); Nation,
Demand supra note 104, at 400 (“Notes used in commercial lending that provide
for payment on demand have been the source of a significant amount of litiga-
tion.” (citation omitted)).
139. See infra notes 141–61 and accompanying text.
140. See, e.g., Shawmut Bank, N.A. v. Miller, 614 N.E.2d 668 (Mass. 1993) (applying
demandable note analysis in the commercial lending context); Bottrell v. Am.
Bank, 773 P.2d 694 (Mont. 1989) (using demandable note analysis and intimat-
ing that a period of notice is required to be given to the maker before the note
matures).  Both Bottrell and Shawmut are discussed in Nation, Demand Notes,
supra note 104, at 401–06. See also Simon v. N.H. Sav. Bank, 296 A.2d 913 (N.H.
1972) (applying demandable note analysis).  In Simon, the plaintiff applied to the
bank for a twenty-year construction loan repayable at the rate of $144 per month.
Id. at 914.  The bank lent the borrower money; however, the mortgage provided
for “the mortgager’s note or notes . . . payable to the order of the . . . bank, on
demand, with interest payable monthly.” Id.  The mortgage then provided, “It is
further agreed without the mortgagee waiving the right to demand payment in
full at any time that One Hundred Forty-Four . . . Dollars be paid monthly begin-
ning [7 months after the date of the note].” Id.  The note contained similar provi-
sions. Id.  The majority held the note and mortgage to be demand obligations.
Id. at 915.  The dissent by Justice Grimes found that the obligation was payable
on demand only in the event of default, stating: “Here there was an application
for a loan for a term of 20 years.  The bank’s investment committee recommended
a loan for a term of 20 years.  Both the note and mortgage provide for monthly
payments which are consistent with a twenty-year installment debt.” Id. at 916.
Under the U.C.C., a demand provision should not be interpreted as making the
note a pure demand note because given the context of commercial lending, such
an interpretation is quite likely to result in an unfair surprise to the maker. See
Dennis M. Patterson, Good Faith, Lender Liability, and Discretionary Accelera-
tion: Of Llewellyn, Wittgenstein, and the Uniform Commercial Code, 68 TEX. L.
REV. 169 (1989).
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C. Revised Article 3—More Ambiguities
The drafters of Revised Article 3 attempted to clear up some of the
ambiguity surrounding demand notes in Section 3-108(c), which pro-
vides that “If an instrument, payable at a fixed date, is also payable
upon demand made before the fixed date, the instrument is payable on
demand until the fixed date and, if demand for payment is not made
before that date, becomes payable at a definite time on the fixed
date.”141  Thus, it is clear under Section 3-108(c) that a note providing
that it is payable on demand but if demand is not sooner made then in
installments, is a demand note; one that requires the holder to make
an actual demand for payment is a demandable note.142  In addition,
3-108(a) provides that “A promise or order is ‘payable on demand’ if it
(i) states that it is payable on demand or at sight, or otherwise indi-
cates that it is payable at the will of the holder, or (ii) does not state
any time of payment.”143  As noted, this definition unfortunately cre-
ates some new ambiguity regarding whether a time note that includes
an “at will” acceleration provision should be treated as a demand
note.144  Certainly one could consider such a note to be payable at the
will of the holder.  However, such an interpretation would seem to
render Section 1-309 at least partially irrelevant.145
Revised Article 3 leaves us with a conundrum: Are demand notes
the same as time notes subject to at will acceleration?146  Or, to re-
phrase the same question with dramatically different results, are time
notes subject to at will acceleration demand notes?147  If the answer to
the first question is yes, then why do the courts treat these instru-
ments so differently?148  If the answer to the second question is yes,
then Section 1-309 is a dead letter.149  But, if we answer no to either
141. U.C.C. § 3-108(c) (2002).
142. Id. Prior to these revisions some courts had trouble classifying notes of these
types. See supra note 94.
143. U.C.C. § 3-108(a).
144. Id.
145. See id. § 3-109, cmt. 1 (2002) (this section does not apply to demand instruments).
146. According to the express terms of both notes, the time when the maker must pay
the note is subject to the discretion of the holder. See supra note 72.
147. That is, according to the express language of a time note with an “at will” acceler-
ation clause, it is payable at the will of the holder.
148. That is, the holder of a demand note may demand payment at any time for any
reason, but the holder of a time note subject to “at will” acceleration may only
demand payment when he in good faith believes that the prospect of payment or
performance has been impaired. See supra notes 50–55 and accompanying text.
149. Section 1-309 applies to acceleration pursuant to an “at will” or similar discre-
tionary right to accelerate, but does not apply to demand notes.  U.C.C. § 1-309
(2001).  Thus, if a note providing the holder with the right to accelerate “at will”
is a demand note, then Section 1-309 would apply to nothing.
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or both questions, what is the basis for that conclusion?150  Is there
any real difference between a demand note and a time note that pro-
vides for at will acceleration?  If there is, what is the nature of that
difference and how does that inform our treatment of demand notes in
the commercial lending context?
Consider two notes: One provides that it is payable on demand but
if demand is not sooner made then in monthly installments of princi-
pal and interest over three years.  The other provides that it is payable
in thirty-six monthly installments of principal and interest and in-
cludes an acceleration clause that provides that the holder may accel-
erate at will.  What is the real difference between these two notes?
They both, at least according to their terms, represent a three-year
loan subject to the discretion of the holder to call the note at any time.
In one case calling the loan is considered a demand for payment and in
the other it is considered acceleration.  Is this a distinction without a
difference?  Legally, of course, there is an important difference; the
holder of the second note may accelerate only if he in good faith be-
lieves that the prospect of payment or performance has been impaired
pursuant to U.C.C. Section 1-309,151 while the holder of the first note
arguably has the unfettered discretion to arbitrarily and capriciously
call the note at any time for any reason, good or bad, and is expressly
not subject to any good-faith obligation in making his decision to de-
mand payment.152  Why do the policies underlying Section 1-309 not
apply in the case of the first note?  Obviously, the technical answer is
because the first note is a demand note and the second note is a time
note.  Such an answer, however, simply begs the question: Should the
policy underlying Section 1-309, which uses an obligation of good faith
to limit the contracting parties freedom, apply to demand notes used
in commercial lending?153
150. Perhaps there is a clue in the Official Comments to U.C.C. Section 1-309, which
say that the provision does not apply to a demand instrument or to instruments
whose very nature permits call at any time with or without reason. U.C.C. § 1-
309, cmt. 1.  Rather, Section 1-309 applies only to an agreement or to paper which
in the first instance is payable at a future date.  It would be possible to argue that
a note providing that it is payable on demand, but if demand is not sooner made
in installments, is “in the first instance” payable at a future date (because if the
holder does nothing the note is not payable until the arrival of the future date,
which is essentially the same as a note subject to a possible acceleration), and
thus should be subject to Section 1-309. See cases cited supra note 94.  However,
this interpretation is noticeably flawed. See infra notes 162–77 and accompany-
ing text.
151. See U.C.C. § 1-309.
152. See supra notes 162–77 and accompanying text.
153. See Nation, Recognition, supra note 7 at 88–95 (concluding that Section 1-309
should not apply to demand type instruments and stating that “the right to accel-
erate ‘at will’ should not be interpreted as creating . . . a demand-type obliga-
tion”).  However, that does not mean that U.C.C. Section 1-304 does not apply to
demandable notes. See infra notes 162–77 and accompanying text.
172 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:151
The drafters of the U.C.C. and all of the state legislatures that
adopted the U.C.C. have decided, evidently, that the holder’s freedom
to negotiate broad discretion to accelerate is trumped by the bor-
rower’s interest in relying on the availability of the loan proceeds un-
less its credit worthiness deteriorates.154  What is it about a demand
note that changes this analysis?  How should courts balance the inter-
ests of the borrower and the lender?  In the commercial lending con-
text, an analysis based on the assumption that an obligation to act in
good faith does not apply—purportedly because the holder of a de-
mand note does not exercise any discretion or take any action to ma-
ture the note since the note is always due and payable from the
moment it is executed—is a dangerous fiction.155  Legally, in the case
of a demandable note this analysis is technically incorrect since such a
note requires the holder to make an actual demand before the note
matures,156 but even in the case of a pure/traditional demand note
this “mature note” analysis is incorrect.157  The holder of a demand
note—pure/traditional or demandable—always exercises discretion in
deciding when to demand payment.158  In some contexts, however, for
example a check, this analysis does not create significant problems.159
The nature of a check is such that the funds to pay the check are al-
ways in liquid form and are required to be available at the time the
check is written out.160  Thus, allowing the holder of a check to de-
mand payment at any time does not create an unfair burden for the
drawer.  The commercial lending context, however, is very different
and requires different rules.161
154. Whether the holder may accelerate pursuant to more specific events of default
without having to show that it believes in good faith that the prospect of payment
or performance has been impaired is unclear. See Nation, Recognition, supra
note 7, at n.36.
155. See supra notes 85–89 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 127–40 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 68–72 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 72.
159. See U.C.C. § 3-104(f) (2002).
160. If the funds are not available in the account when the check is written, then the
drawer may be liable for check fraud. See generally Thomas E. McCurnin & Pe-
ter A. Frandsen, Grounding Check Kiting with Check 21: The Civil and Criminal
Ramifications of Check Kiting in the 21st Century, 125 BANKING L.J. 295 (2008)
(discussing check kiting, steps banks can take to prevent and discover check kit-
ing, and how to collect loss from the customer or insurance bond); see also Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency, Check Fraud: A Guide to Avoiding Losses,
http://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/other-publications-reports/
pub-other-check-fraud.pdf, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/4PDR-2XAJ (Feb.
1999).
161. See supra note 131 and accompanying text; infra notes 162–77 and accompanying
text.
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D. Achieving Balance
One productive approach that I have written about in the past ana-
lyzes the discretion exercised by the holder of a demand note in de-
manding payment as relating to three separate events:162 first, the
holder’s decision to demand payment; second, the actual making/com-
municating of the demand for payment to the maker; and third, set-
ting the date on which the note must be paid.163  The advantage of
this approach is that it allows for balancing the interests of both the
borrower and the lender.164  The lender’s right to demand payment at
any time and for any reason is preserved, and as a result, the real
distinction between time and demand type notes is preserved.165
However, the holder must make its demand to the borrower in good
faith, and more importantly must set the repayment date in good
faith.166
In some cases it may be consistent with the observance of reasona-
ble commercial standards of fair dealing to set the repayment date on
the day immediately following the holder’s demand for payment.167
However, this would usually not be the case in the commercial lending
context.168  Setting repayment terms in good faith in the commercial
lending context would typically require that the maker be given a rea-
sonable time to arrange refinancing.169  This makes sense given that
most commercial borrowers plan an illiquid use of the loan pro-
ceeds.170  That is, in order for a commercial borrower/maker to pay the
note in response to a demand for payment the borrower must arrange
refinancing from another lender.171  Thus, to be fair to the borrower,
the borrower must be given the opportunity to refinance, and to be fair
to the holder, the holder must have the right to “call the note”—that
is, start the clock running on the refinance time—at any time and for
162. See Nation, Demand Notes, supra note 104, at 395–400; Nation, Recognition,
supra note 7, at 77–83.
163. See Nation, Demand Notes, supra note 104, at 395–400; Nation, Recognition,
supra note 7, at 77–83.
164. The holder’s right to demand payment for any reason is preserved and the bor-
rower will have a reasonable time to arrange refinancing in order to pay pursu-
ant to the holder’s demand.
165. See Nation, Demand Notes, supra note 104, at 395–400; Nation, Recognition,
supra note 7, at 77–83.
166. See Nation, Demand Notes, supra note 104, at 395–400; Nation, Recognition,
supra note 7, at 77–83.
167. See, e.g., checks under U.C.C. § 3-104(f) (2002); see also supra notes 159–61.
168. See supra note 131.
169. See Nation, Demand Notes, supra note 104, at 395–400; Nation, Recognition,
supra note 7, at 77–83.
170. See supra note 131.
171. See Nation, Demand Notes, supra note 104, at 395–400.
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any reason.172  However, it is important to note that this reasonable
refinance time would be based on the time necessary for the borrower
to arrange refinancing assuming the borrower is financially healthy,
or at least as financially healthy as the borrower was when the loan
originated.173
Under this analysis, since there will usually be a gap of time be-
tween when demand for payment is made and when payment is due,
the note will essentially become a time note for the period after de-
mand for payment is made, but before payment becomes due.174
Therefore, all of those provisions that would be relevant to a time
note, including an acceleration provision, would also be relevant in a
demand note used in the commercial lending context under this analy-
sis.175  For example, a Section 3-108(c) note could be called—meaning
the holder could make demand for payment at any time—but the note
would not become due and payable until the expiration of a reasonable
refinance time.  During this refinance time the holder would need to
be protected from a possible deterioration in the borrower’s credit wor-
thiness.176  As a result, a typical acceleration provision and event of
default definition would be necessary to protect the lender during this
period of time.177
It is also important to note that under this analysis Section 1-309
is not being applied to demand notes.  The holder of a demand-type
note would not have to wait until the prospect of payment or perform-
ance of the note was impaired in order to call the note.  However, the
holder would be required to give the maker a reasonable time, refi-
nance time, to respond to the demand for payment.
I would encourage the drafters of the U.C.C. to strongly consider
revising Article 3 to provide that the holder of a demand-type promis-
sory note may make a demand for payment at any time and for any
reason, including reasons unrelated to the maker’s ability to pay.
However, such a demand for payment must be made in a commercially
reasonable manner, and if the promissory note was given in exchange
for a loan of money for a commercial purpose, then the maker must be
172. Id. at 398–99 (“[T]he holder’s decision to demand payment is not subject to an
obligation to act in good faith.  However, the holder of either a demand or a de-
mandable note should be subject to an obligation of good faith in setting the re-
payment terms for the note.”).
173. See Nation, Recognition, supra note 7, at 72 (“The borrower may agree to a de-
mand-type instrument as long as the borrower is given enough time (between the
lender’s demand and the borrower’s obligation to pay) to arrange refinancing.”).
174. See, e.g., Nation, Recognition, supra note 7, at 74 (providing suggested repayment
provisions for a demandable note, which include an acceleration clause).
175. Id.
176. See generally supra notes 108–27 and accompanying text (discussing acceleration
clauses).
177. See Nation, Recognition, supra note 174, at 73–74.
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given a reasonable time to make payment in response to the holder’s
demand for payment.  Further, what constitutes a reasonable time
shall be determined in accordance with the time necessary for the bor-
rower, if financially healthy, to arrange refinancing of the debt repre-
sented by the note.
E. Freedom of Contract
The principle of freedom of contract stands for the idea that compe-
tent parties should be free to enter into whatever bargains they desire
and on whatever terms they desire within the broad parameters es-
tablished by the legal system.178  These broad parameters include, in-
ter alia, the requirement that the bargain entered into have a legal
object and that there be no misrepresentation, duress, undue influ-
ence, or mistake in the contract formation process.179  In addition, the
doctrine of freedom of contract stands for the idea that a court’s job is
to enforce the parties’ agreement as long as it falls within the parame-
ters mentioned above, regardless of whether the court believes the
agreement is wise or unwise, a good deal or a bad one.180  The court’s
role is not to approve or improve the contract; it is to enforce the con-
tract the parties created.181
How is it possible to square the doctrine of freedom of contract with
the above interpretation of demand notes?  Again, Reger is a good ex-
ample to consider.  As the Seventh Circuit noted in its opinion, the
language used by National City made clear that the note created a
demand-type obligation.182  The note said it was payable “on de-
mand.”183  Further, the note explicitly stated that the borrower “will
pay this loan in full immediately upon Lender’s demand.”184  Finally,
there was the statement in prominent, capital letters, as noted, stat-
ing that: “NOTWITHSTANDING ANY PROVISION OR INFERENCE
TO THE CONTRARY, LENDER SHALL HAVE NO OBLIGATION
TO EXTEND ANY CREDIT TO OR FOR THE ACCOUNT OF BOR-
ROWER BY REASON OF THIS NOTE.”185  I argue that the plain
178. See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1-3 at 5
(2d ed. 1977) (asserting freedom of contract is “a basic principle” of the legal sys-
tem); U.C.C. § 1-302 (2001) (stating parties may, except as otherwise provided,
vary provisions by agreement).
179. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 6 (1981) (Mistake); id. ch. 7 (Mis-
representation, Duress and Undue Influence); id. ch. 8 (Unenforceability on
Grounds of Public Policy).
180. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 178, § 1-3 at 4–6 (stating that parties’ power
to contract as they please for lawful purposes remains a basic principle of our
legal system).
181. Id.
182. Reger Dev., LLC v. Nat’l City Bank, 592 F.3d 759, 765 (7th Cir. 2010).
183. Id. at 762.
184. Id.
185. Id.
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meaning of some of this language is overcome because it is inconsis-
tent with other language in the note, as discussed infra,186 and be-
cause it is inconsistent with the nature of commercial lending187 and
the course of dealing between the parties.188  As a result, I argue that
National City could have called the loan at any time and for any rea-
son, but unless the bank in good faith believed that the prospect of
payment or performance had been impaired, the bank would have
been required to allow Reger Development a reasonable time to ar-
range refinancing before the loan would become due and payable.189
Freedom of contract is not absolute190 and there have always been
limits placed on this freedom.191  Moreover, freedom of contract is not
the only important principle of contract law.  Protecting the commer-
cially reasonable expectations of the parties is also important, which
is reflected in the general requirement that all contracting parties
must exercise discretion in good faith.192  The ultimate goal behind
the doctrine of freedom of contract and the doctrine of good faith is to
protect the commercially reasonable expectations of the parties.193
While the parties’ expectations are usually consistent with their writ-
ten contract, in some instances the expectations of the parties are in-
consistent with their written contract.194  This situation most
commonly occurs when the actual parties entering into the contract,
for example the loan officer and borrower, have not themselves
drafted, read, and understood the terms of the written contract.195
186. See infra notes 236–302 and accompanying text.
187. See supra note 131.
188. See, e.g., Reger, 592 F.3d. at 762 (explaining National City had lent money to
Reger for several previous projects).
189. See infra notes 216–30 and accompanying text.
190. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 6 (1981) (Mistake); id. ch. 7 (Mis-
representation, Duress and Undue Influence); id. ch. 8 (Unenforceability on
Grounds of Public Policy); see, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-302 (2001) (freedom of contract
subject to specific exclusions).
191. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 6 (Mistake); id. ch. 7 (Misrepresen-
tation, Duress and Undue Influence); id. ch. 8 (Unenforceability on Grounds of
Public Policy).
192. See sources cited supra notes 64–65.
193. The U.C.C. defines good faith as “honesty in fact and the observance of reasona-
ble commercial standards of fair dealing.” U.C.C. § 1-201(20) (2001).  This defini-
tion is in part objective and is intended to protect the reasonable expectations of
the parties. Id. cmt. 20 (noting that this standard is concerned with fairness of
conduct).
194. See, e.g., cases discussed supra note 131.  For example, in Reid v. Key Bank of S.
Me., Inc., 821 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1987), the note stated that it was payable on de-
mand but also contained an acceleration clause.  The court concluded the note
was a time note and could be called only if the holder in good faith believed the
prospect of payment or performance had been impaired. Id. at 13–15. Reid is
discussed infra notes 257–78 and accompanying text.
195. See, e.g., Reger Dev., LLC v. Nat’l City Bank, 592 F.3d 759, 762–63 (7th Cir.
2010)  (noting that borrower expressed surprise at lender’s actions and loan office
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The use of demand notes to document commercial loans often repre-
sents just such a situation.196
A lender may legitimately desire the ability to call a loan at any
time and for reasons unrelated to the borrower’s ability to repay.197
In this case the bank may desire the right to call the loan, even though
it was not concerned about the prospect of repayment.198  Moreover, in
some cases the bank may need repayment very quickly and therefore
desire the right to receive payment immediately upon demand.199
The question is not whether contracting parties in general should
have the freedom to agree to such terms—they should.200  The ques-
tion is: What is necessary to create such an agreement?  I argue here
that in the commercial lending context, the phrase “payable on de-
mand” gives the holder the right to decide to demand payment at any
time and for any reason, but the holder/lender must give the maker/
borrower a reasonable time to respond to the demand for payment.201
In essence, the phrase “payable on demand” gives the holder/lender
the right to start the clock running on the maker/borrower’s reasona-
ble time to respond to the demand—the refinance time—at any time
and for any reason, but it is not sufficient to give the holder/lender the
right to make the loan immediately due and payable upon demand.202
As noted above, the phrase “payable on demand” may, in the appropri-
ate context, create a demand-type obligation that would become due
and payable immediately upon demand for payment, but this will
rarely, if ever, be the case in the commercial lending context.203
The commercial lending context, as noted, typically contemplates
that the borrower will use the funds in a manner that makes them
illiquid.204  That is, it would be very difficult if not impossible for the
borrower to immediately repay the loan once the borrower has in-
stated the form documents were nonnegotiable); see also, Nation, Demand Notes,
supra note 104, at 391–95 (noting that lenders often use their superior bargain-
ing power to include a demand repayment provision to try to “have it both ways”
by creating specific repayment dates to please the borrower, but retaining the
enforcement flexibility of a demand obligation).
196. See Nation, Demand Notes, supra note 104, at 392–94 (“The use of demand notes
in commercial lending is illogical because most borrowers plan an illiquid use of
the loan proceeds and could not repay the loan on short notice, let alone with no
notice.”).
197. See Nation, Demand Notes, supra note 104, at 391 (noting that a lender may have
internal reasons unrelated to the borrower’s financial health for calling the loan).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See sources cited supra note 178.
201. See infra notes 216–29 and accompanying text.
202. See infra notes 221–27 and accompanying text.
203. See, e.g., supra notes 159–60 (discussing checks, which are demand instruments
by definition).
204. See Nation, Demand Notes, supra note 104, at 392–94.
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vested the loan proceeds.205  The unthinking, rote application of the
doctrine of freedom of contract would suggest no sympathy for the bor-
rower since the borrower did not spell out in the agreement what it
needed—that the borrower should have insisted on a time note.  Nev-
ertheless, both the lender and the borrower know that the borrower
cannot pay immediately upon demand.206  Further, Section 1-309 rec-
ognizes that, in the context of acceleration, there should be a limita-
tion on the lender’s ability to exercise its discretion in a way that
obviously and predictably disadvantages the borrower;207 I argue by
analogy that the law should recognize a similar limitation in the con-
text of demanding payment of a demand note.208  Moreover, this is
clearly consistent with the general obligation of good faith imposed by
both the common law and the U.C.C.209  However, it is important to
note that I am not arguing for the application of a Section 1-309 limi-
tation to the holders of demand notes.  That is, I am not asserting that
the holder of a demand note must in good faith believe that the pros-
pect of payment has become impaired before he or she may call the
note.210  Quite the contrary, I am arguing that the holder of a demand
note is specifically not subject to that limitation; the holder may de-
mand payment at any time and for any reason, but the note will not
mature immediately upon the making of a demand for payment, at
least not in the commercial lending context.211
There has always been a limit to what the terms of a contract can
accomplish under the law.212  For example, assume that a contract
labeled “Sales Agreement” is entered into in connection with a buyer’s
offer to purchase a car and that the contract contains a provision stat-
ing the following:
Notwithstanding any other provision contained herein, including buyer’s pay-
ment of the purchase price, the seller has no obligation to deliver the car, to
transfer title to the car to the buyer, or to deliver possession of the car to the
buyer, and further, if seller does deliver the car to the buyer the seller has the
right to regain possession of the car, at buyer’s expense, at any time.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 393 n.54 (noting that the purpose for which the borrower is going to use the
loan proceeds is a very important aspect of the loan transaction and is discussed
by the borrower and lender).
207. See U.C.C. § 1-309 (2001) (discussed infra at notes 256–67 and accompanying
text).
208. See infra notes 269–302 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 65–66, 193 and accompanying text.
210. See Nation, Recognition, supra note 7, at 77 (arguing the specific obligation of
good faith found in [Section 1-309] should not apply to any demand-type
instrument).
211. See infra notes 216–30 and accompanying text.
212. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-302 (a)–(b) (2001) (allowing the parties to vary provisions of
the U.C.C. by agreement but also limiting that power).
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Assume further, as in Reger, that the buyer paid $5,000 to the seller at
the time of signing the contract.213  Obviously no court should enforce
such a provision.  It is completely inconsistent with the transaction it
purports to document.  The seller may like the provision and argue
freedom of contract, but freedom of contract will not save it.214  The
Seventh Circuit held that as long as the buyer, in fact, gets the car,
even for a short time, the contract is enforceable.215  The Seventh Cir-
cuit is wrong.
F. Good Faith
The common law of contracts, as well as the U.C.C., create obliga-
tions of good faith.216  For example, Section 1-304 imposes a general
obligation of good faith in the performance and enforcement of every
contract.  In addition, Section 1-309 imposes a specific obligation of
good faith on acceleration pursuant to “at will” and other similar non-
specific events of default.217  The U.C.C. defines good faith, for all pur-
poses other than Article 5, as: “[H]onesty in fact and the observance of
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.”218  The Official
Comments make clear that fair dealing is a broad term that must be
defined in context and that it is concerned with the fairness of the
conduct rather than the care with which the act is performed.219  Fur-
ther, Section 1-302 provides that the obligation of good faith may not
be disclaimed by agreement of the parties’ freedom of contract not-
withstanding.220  Section 1-304 does not create a separate specific ob-
ligation, rather it applies to the performance or enforcement of
obligations agreed to by the parties.221
I argue here that, in the commercial lending context, the commer-
cially reasonable enforcement of the maker’s obligation to pay on de-
mand should usually require that the maker be given a reasonable
time to respond to the lender’s demand for payment before the note
becomes due and payable.  This interpretation, in the commercial
lending context, makes sense for both demand and demandable
213. Reger Development paid a $5,000 closing fee for the line of credit.  Reger Dev.,
LLC v. Nat’l City Bank, 592 F.3d 759, 763 (7th Cir. 2010).
214. See supra notes 178–79 and accompanying text.
215. See Reger, 592 F.3d at 766 (holding that adequate consideration passed during
the transaction because Reger was, in fact, permitted to draw funds under the
line).
216. See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 50–54, 70–77 and accompanying text.
218. U.C.C. § 1-201(20) (2001).
219. See id. § 1-201(20), cmt. 20.
220. See id. § 1-302 (2001); supra notes 190–93 and accompanying text.
221. See id. § 1-304, cmt. 1; Nation, Recognition, supra note 7, at 56–57 n.21.
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notes.222  Even in the case of a traditional/pure demand note, the
holder clearly exercises discretion when demanding payment of the
note and when taking enforcement action, thus the obligation of good
faith should apply to the performance of that conduct notwithstanding
the legal fiction that a demand note is mature from the moment it is
signed.223  Applying this interpretation to both demand and demand-
able notes properly recognizes the fundamental distinction between
time- and demand-type instruments by preserving, in the case of de-
mand-type instruments, the holder’s/lender’s ability to call the loan at
any time and for any reason.224  That is, the lender may start the
clock running on the reasonable time that the maker has to respond to
the demand for payment at any time the lender desires.225  The
maker’s reasonable expectations are protected because the maker will
be given a reasonable time to arrange refinancing when the lender/
holder demands payment.226  Unless the lender in good faith believes
that the prospect of payment or performance has become impaired,
the note will not become immediately due and payable upon the
holder’s/lender’s demand for payment.227
Under this interpretation any demand-type note would become, in
fact, a time note once demand for payment was made, and would con-
tain provisions such as an acceleration clause that are commonly
found in time instruments.228  Thus, for example, a U.C.C. Section 3-
108(c) note would have three possible maturities: first, if everything
went as planned it would become payable on the specific repayment
dates included; second, if the holder desired repayment for reasons
unrelated to the makers ability to pay the note it would become due
and payable a reasonable time after the holder demanded payment;
and finally, if the maker’s ability to repay the loan deteriorated to the
point that the holder in good faith believed that the prospect of pay-
ment or performance had become impaired or if a specific event of de-
fault occurred, the note would become immediately due and payable
via acceleration.229  Under the U.C.C. the parties are not permitted to
disclaim the obligation of good faith, but they are permitted to define
222. The application of the general obligation of good faith to pure demand notes has
been strengthened by the U.C.C. drafters’ revision of former Section 3-122(1)(b),
which provided that a demand note was mature on its date or date of issue for
statute of limitations purposes.  Today, Section 3-118, does not state when a
cause of action accrues and thus avoids the extraneous issues associated with
former Section 3-122(1)(b). U.C.C. § 3-118 (2002).
223. Id.
224. See Nation, Demand Notes, supra note 104, at 395–400.
225. Id.
226. See supra notes 162–77 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 162–77 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 173–77 and accompanying text.
229. See, e.g., Nation, Recognition, supra note 7, at 78–79 (suggesting repayment pro-
vision for a demandable note).
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it as long as their definition is not manifestly unreasonable.230  Thus,
the parties should define a reasonable refinance time in the note, and
the courts should enforce such definition as long as it is, in fact,
reasonable.
G. Negotiability
One issue that may arise concerning demand-type instruments
and the interpretation I argue for here is how this interpretation af-
fects the negotiability of these instruments.  To be negotiable an in-
strument must be payable on demand or at a definite time.231  Under
the interpretation here asserted, demand notes used in commercial
lending would not be payable until a reasonable time after demand for
payment is made by the holder.232  For a Section 3-108(c) demand
note, this interpretation does not impair certainty of time of payment
because the maximum term of the loan is stated and thus it is no dif-
ferent with respect to time of payment than a time note subject to
acceleration.233  In the case of a note that says only that it is payable
on demand, an argument could be made that under the analysis ar-
gued for here the time of payment (being a reasonable time after the
demand for payment is made) is uncertain, and therefore the instru-
ment is not negotiable.234  However, an argument could also be made
that this amount of uncertainty is tolerable because it results from the
application of the general obligation of good faith that applies
throughout Article 3.235  In any event, if negotiability is important to
the parties, they should specifically define a reasonable time in the
instrument or use a Section 3-108(c)-type note that provides for a defi-
nite due date unless demand for payment is sooner made.
230. See supra notes 190–93, 220–21 and accompanying text.
231. U.C.C. § 3-104(a)(2) (2002).
232. See supra notes 162–78 and accompanying text.
233. See U.C.C. § 3-108 cmt. (2002) (providing that if a definite time limit is stated,
negotiability is unaffected).
234. Generally, the time of payment is considered definite so long as the latest date
when the holder may seek payment is clearly stated, even though the note may
become payable sooner under the circumstances.  However, under the interpreta-
tion argued for here, the later date is somewhat uncertain because it will be a
reasonable time after the holder demands payment.  If the parties agree to set a
later date for payment, the note should be considered payable at a definite time.
For example, if the note provides, “This note shall become due and payable no
later than 120 days after the holder’s demand for payment,” the note would be
payable at a definite time.
235. The general obligation of good faith, which applies throughout the U.C.C., should
not apply to the setting of the repayment date because the note is clearly payable
on demand.
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IV. SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S ANALYSIS
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court’s
dismissal of Reger Development’s complaint for failure to state a
claim.236  The court found the main question in the case to be whether
the note signed by Reger Development entitled the lender, National
City, to demand payment from Reger Development at will.237  How-
ever, this was not the real issue in the case because both a pure/tradi-
tional demand note and a demandable note allow the holder to
demand payment at any time.238  The real issue was whether the note
in that case, a demandable note, matures immediately upon a demand
for payment, or whether the general obligation of good faith requires
that the maker be given a reasonable time to respond to the demand
before the note matures.  Based on the court’s examination of the note,
and accepting as true the allegations contained in the complaint, the
court found that National City did indeed have the right, unfettered
by any good-faith obligation, to demand payment at any time for any
reason—good or bad, arbitrary or capricious.239  This conclusion,
while accurate, does not answer the relevant question in the case,
which is whether the note matures immediately upon the making of a
demand or whether the obligation to act in good faith requires the
holder to give the maker a reasonable time to respond to the demand
before the note matures.  The court confused the holder’s right to de-
mand payment at any time with the issue of whether the note matures
immediately upon the making of a demand for payment.  As a result,
the court ultimately concluded, without ever focusing directly on the
later issue, that: “[V]iewed as a whole in a light most favorable to
Reger Development, the note before us is plainly a demand instru-
ment entitling National City to collect its loan whenever it wants.”240
Under the broad standard applied to motions to dismiss for failure to
state a claim, the court incorrectly held that Reger Development’s
complaint failed to state a claim for relief that was plausible on its
face.241  As a result, Reger Development never had the opportunity to
present its case.
The court’s confusion regarding demand and demandable notes
played an important part in the court’s erroneous conclusions.  The
court’s reasoning is based on the questionable, if not erroneous, tradi-
tional analysis of a pure/traditional demand note, which indulges a
legal fiction that considers the note due from the moment it is
236. Reger Dev., LLC v. Nat’l City Bank, 592 F.3d 759, 767 (7th Cir. 2010).
237. Id. at 762.
238. See supra notes 217–30 and accompanying text.
239. See Reger, 592 F.3d at 766.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 767.
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signed.242  However, the note signed by Reger Development is clearly
a demandable note because it requires an actual demand by the holder
in order to become mature,243 and as a result, even under traditional
analysis the Reger note did not become due upon signing, but required
National City to make an actual demand for payment before the note
became due.244
The court’s mistake is evident, for example, in its discussion of the
obligation to act in good faith.  The court noted that under Illinois law,
a covenant of fair dealing and good faith is implied into every contract,
but concluded that the duty to act in good faith does not apply to a
lender seeking payment on a demand note.245  This conclusion is, at
best, accurate with regard to a pure/traditional demand note under
the traditional analysis discussed supra,246 but is not true with re-
spect to a demandable note.247  As noted, the traditional analysis of
pure/traditional demand notes indulges a legal fiction that a pure/
traditional demand note is due from the moment it is signed by the
maker.248  As a result of this legal fiction, the holder of such a note
does not technically need to take any action to mature the note—it is
already mature.  Thus, in the case of a pure/traditional demand note,
the holder, at least theoretically,249 exercises no discretion to which
the obligation to act in good faith may be applied.  This is not, how-
ever, the case with a demandable note; demandable notes do not, even
under the traditional analysis, become due and payable until the
holder makes an actual demand for payment.250  For demandable
notes, the holder exercises discretion when making an actual demand
for payment.251
The general obligation to act in good faith found at common law
and under U.C.C. Section 1-304 is designed to ensure that contracting
parties exercise discretion with honesty and in a commercially reason-
242. See supra notes 85–129 and accompanying text.
243. Reger, 592 F.3d. at 762 (the note states, “Lender shall have given Borrower notice
of demand for payment thereof . . . ”).
244. Id. at 765–66; see also supra notes 130–40 and accompanying text (discussing the
fundamental nature of demand obligations).
245. Reger, 592 F.3d at 764.
246. See supra notes 85–129 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 130–40 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 85–129 and accompanying text.
249. See Nation, Recognition, supra note 7, at 56 (“[G]ood faith is not an issue as there
is no duty or act to which the obligation to act in good faith could be applied.”); cf.
id. at n.21 (arguing that the obligation of good faith should apply to demand
notes).
250. See Nation, Recognition, supra note 7, at 62 (“[D]emandable notes require an ac-
tual demand for payment by the holder prior to maturity, and demand notes do
not.” (footnote omitted)).
251. See supra notes 162–77 and accompanying text.
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able manner.252  There is another obligation of good faith under
U.C.C. Section 1-309 that applies only to the exercise of discretion
under an acceleration clause.253  This specific obligation of good faith
is not applicable to either pure/traditional demand notes or to de-
mandable notes because the holders of these instruments may decide
to demand payment at any time and for any reason.254  That is, de-
mand-type instruments (pure/traditional demand notes and demand-
able notes) represent obligations whose very nature permits demand
for payment to be made at any time and for any reason.255  However,
the fact that the specific obligation of good faith under Section 1-309 is
not applicable to demandable notes does not mean that the general
obligation to act in good faith under Section 1-304 does not apply to
demandable notes.256
The court’s confusion is further illustrated in its discussion of good
faith where it incorrectly cited cases discussing pure/traditional de-
mand notes, rather than demandable notes, and cited cases discussing
the specific obligation of good faith under Section 1-309, rather than
the general good faith obligation under Section 1-304.  For example,
the court cited N.W.I. International Inc. v. Edgewood Bank257 for the
position that while Illinois law generally holds that “a covenant of fair
dealing and good faith is implied into every contract . . . the duty to act
in good faith does not apply to lenders seeking payment on demand
notes.”258  The Edgewood court stated, in the context of reviewing jury
instructions: “[I]f, with proper instructions, the note was found to be a
demand instrument . . . there would be no ‘good-faith’ issues.”259  The
Edgewood court cited Shawmut Bank, N.A. v. Miller260 in support of
this statement.261  But Edgewood’s citation to Shawmut makes clear
that Edgewood’s statement is in reference to pure/traditional demand
notes and not demandable notes, as the following quotes from the
Shawmut decision explain:
252. See supra notes 216–30 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 216–30 and accompanying text.
254. See Nation, Recognition, supra note 7, at 61–62 (“The interpretation universally
associated with the ‘payable on demand’ language is that the holder has the right
to unilaterally determine the time for payment. . . .  Holders of demand notes can
do this because they can maintain suit on the instrument from its moment of
issue.  While holders of demandable notes . . . can initiate at any time and for any
reason a process that will culminate in maturity and their right to maintain suit
on the instrument.” (footnotes omitted)); supra notes 216–30 and accompanying
text.
255. Nation, Recognition, supra note 7, at 61.
256. See supra notes 216–30 and accompanying text.
257. 684 N.E.2d 401 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
258. Reger Dev., LLC v. Nat’l City Bank, 592 F.3d 759, 764 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing
Edgewood, 684 N.E.2d at 409).
259. Edgewood, 684 N.E.2d at 409.
260. 614 N.E.2d 668 (Mass. 1993).
261. Edgewood, 684 N.E.2d at 409.
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Not only is the balance due on a traditional [pure] demand note collectible
without demand, but also a holder of such a note may determine to collect the
balance due for any reason, good or bad.  Good faith is not a condition of a
holder’s decision to collect the amount due on a demand note.262
The Shawmut Court cited cases from various jurisdictions and con-
cluded with the following: “These opinions reject any claim that [Sec-
tion 1-309], imposes a duty of good faith in the enforcement of the
obligation of a demand note.  The Official Comment to [Section 1-309]
makes clear that [Section 1-309] was not intended to apply to demand
notes.”263  However, this part of the Shawmut decision is limited to
the specific good faith obligation under Section 1-309 and does not con-
cern the general good faith obligation under Section 1-304.264
The court in Shawmut noted that the plaintiffs made no claim con-
cerning the general obligation of good faith under Section 1-304:  “The
Millers do not rely on [U.C.C. Section 1-304], which states a general
obligation that ‘[e]very contract or duty within this chapter imposes
an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement.’”265  Al-
though Shawmut recognized authority against applying a general ob-
ligation of good faith to the decision of the holder of a demand note to
demand payment, this does not concern the issue of whether the gen-
eral obligation of good faith applies to the determination of how soon
after actual demand for payment the note matures.266  Further, the
court cited a decision from Maine that applied the general obligation
of good faith in the context of a demandable note.267
It is clear from the opinion in Shawmut that the note in that case
was a demandable note and not a pure/traditional demand note.268  In
Reger, the court discussed how in the court Reid v. Key Bank269 ap-
plied the specific obligation of good faith found in Section 1-309 to a
note stating that it was payable “on demand” because it found that the
note was actually a time note.270  The Reid note provided that it could
262. Shawmut, 614 N.E.2d at 669.
263. Id. at 670.  To again clarify, when Shawmut was decided the specific obligation of
good faith now found at U.C.C. Section 1-309 instead existed at Section 1-208,
and the general obligation of good faith now required by Section 1-304 was found
at 1-203. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
264. Id.
265. Id. at n.7.
266. Id.
267. Id. (citing Diversified Foods, Inc. v. First Nat’l Bank, 605 A.2d 609, 613 (Me.
1992)).
268. Id. at 671 (“The note remained a demand note but due and payable only upon a
demand actually being made.”).
269. 821 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1987).
270. Reger Dev., LLC v. Nat’l City Bank, 592 F.3d 759, 765–66 (7th Cir. 2010); see also
Bank One, Tex. v. Taylor, 970 F.2d 16, 31–32 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding a note with
payable on demand language, when read in conjunction with other provisions in
the note or other loan documents, might be payable on demand if the maker de-
faults in an obligation stated in the loan documents); Simon v. N.H. Sav. Bank,
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be called only after a specified date or pursuant to certain events of
default.271  The Shawmut court acknowledged that the note in its case
also defined events of default, but in contrast to Reid, the Shawmut
court expressly stated that those provisions do not change its “de-
mand” nature.272  Thus, the Shawmut note was not a time note, as
was the case in Reid, and as a result the specific obligation of good
faith under Section 1-309 did not apply.  The Shawmut note defined
events of default, and upon the occurrence of one of these events the
note would become immediately due and payable either automatically
or at the option of the holder.273  Thus, unlike a pure/traditional de-
mand note, this note was not due and payable from the moment it was
signed.  Rather, it would become due and payable as a result of an
actual demand being made by the holder or as a result of the occur-
rence of one of the listed events of default.274
Both Shawmut and Edgewood stand for the proposition that the
specific obligation of good faith contained in Section 1-309 applies only
to time notes.275  Further, these decisions also stand for the proposi-
tion that the general obligation of good faith under Section 1-304 does
not apply to a holder’s decision to demand payment of either a pure/
traditional demand note or a demandable note.276  In other words, the
very nature of demand instruments, either pure/traditional or de-
mandable, allows the holder to decide to demand payment for any rea-
son and at any time.  It does not follow, however, that the note must
be paid immediately upon demand, especially in regards to a demand-
able note.277  Neither case stands for the proposition that the general
obligation of good faith does not apply to the way in which the holder
makes the required actual demand for payment or to the holder’s set-
ting of the terms of repayment.278
296 A.2d 913, 918 (N.J. 1972) (finding provision explicitly preserving right to de-
mand payment at any time prevented provisions for installment payments of
debt from converting demand note to installment note).
271. Reid, 821 F.2d at 13–14.
272. Shawmut, 614 N.E.2d at 671.
273. Id.
274. Id. (“We, therefore, give effect to this supplemental language, and conclude that
the note was due and payable only on demand, unless one of the stated conditions
obviating demand were to occur.”).
275. Id. at 670 (“These opinions reject any claim that [Section 1-309] imposes a duty of
good faith in the enforcement of the obligation of a demand note.”).
276. Id. at 671 (“The parties made no agreement, however, that modified the general
rule that good faith is not an essential element of a holder’s decision to demand
payment of the amount due on a demand note.”).
277. Id. at n.9 (“When the bank demanded payment of the obligation represented by
the note, it . . . stated the time within which [the maker] had to arrange to pay
the debt or to provide a reasonable plan to repay the debt.”).
278. Id. at 672 (“The summary judgment record is barren of any evidence tending to
show the bank’s post-demand bad faith in the fixing of, and insisting on, the
terms under which the bank required payment of the [maker’s] obligation under
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The Seventh Circuit’s confusion is also illustrated by its reference
to the Official Comments to U.C.C. Section 1-309.279  The Official
Comments state that “[t]his section applies only to an obligation of
payment or performance which in the first instance is due at a future
date.”280  Clearly, the specific obligation of good faith contained in Sec-
tion 1-309 is not applicable to either a pure/traditional demand note or
to a demandable note.281  But, the court’s reference to the Section 1-
309’s comments tells us nothing regarding whether the general obliga-
tion of good faith found in U.C.C. Section 1-304 applies to a demand-
able note.282  Moreover, it is clear from the provisions of the Reger
note quoted by the court, as well as the court’s analysis of various pro-
visions of the note that Reger Development alleged are inconsistent
with that of a standard demand note, that the Reger note was a de-
mandable note and not a pure/traditional demand note.283
For example, in discussing the default interest rate provision that
provided for a 3% increase in the rate after default and the prepay-
ment clause that allowed the borrower to pay down all or a portion of
the note before it is due, the court was “not persuaded by the sugges-
tion that these references to due dates and default somehow over-
power the repeated, explicit contract language setting forth the
lenders right to demand payment at any time.”284  The reason for the
court’s conclusion is that a bank may create a note that specifies a
future payment date that will apply unless a demand for payment, an
actual demand for payment, is sooner made.285  The court was clearly
describing a demandable note.286
Moreover, based on the language from the Reger note quoted by the
court, the note was undoubtedly a demandable note and not a pure/
traditional demand note. The court quoted the following provisions
from the note:
the note.  We, therefore, need not consider whether good faith is a necessary ele-
ment of the setting of the terms of a demand for payment when dealing with a
demand note having the special qualities the note [being a demandable note] in
this case.”).
279. Reger Dev., LLC v. Nat’l City Bank, 592 F.3d 759, 764 (7th Cir. 2010).
280. U.C.C. § 1-309, cmt. 1 (2001).
281. See supra note 275.
282. See supra notes 216–30 and accompanying text.
283. Reger, 592 F.3d at 765.
284. Id.
285. Id. (“A bank that wishes to call the Note can specify some future date on which it
needs payment as a ‘due date.’”).
286. See Shawmut Bank, N.A. v. Miller, 614 N.E.2d. 668, 671 (noting that a “garden
variety” traditional/pure demand note becomes due and payable at its inception
and no demand is needed to make it due and payable, but if a note’s other provi-
sions would be superfluous under this traditional analysis then the court should
recognize the parties’ right to create a note that only becomes mature when the
holder makes an actual demand or certain events occur).
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FAILURE TO PAY ON DEMAND. Notwithstanding any other provision set
forth in this Note, if (a) any principal owing under this Note remains unpaid
after Lender shall have given Borrow notice of demand for payment thereof or
after the commencement of any proceeding under any bankruptcy or insol-
vency laws by or against Borrower or (b) any accrued Interest under this Note
remains unpaid after the due date of that Interest, then, and in each such
case, all unpaid principal of this Note shall bear Interest at a rate equal to
three percent (3%) per annum above the rate that would otherwise be
applicable.287
This provision clearly required the holder of the note to give the
maker/borrower “notice of demand for payment.”288  Thus, this note
was plainly a demandable note, and did not become due at the mo-
ment the maker signed it.289  This note would have become due some-
time in the future after the holder made an actual demand for
payment to the maker.290  Moreover, the fact that National City could
have given notice of demand at any time does not necessarily mean
that the note would have become due immediately upon the receipt by
Reger Development of the notice of demand.291  This was clearly the
case—despite an earlier provision of the note quoted by the court that
said the borrower will pay this loan in full immediately upon lenders
demand—because the paragraph quoted above says “notwithstanding
any other provision set forth in this Note” and therefore takes prece-
dence over the conflicting provision.292
Under the “Failure To Pay on Demand” provision set forth above,
the note had three possible maturities: first, failure of the maker to
pay after appropriate notice of demand had been given; second, upon
commencement of any proceeding under any bankruptcy or insolvency
laws by or against the borrower; and finally, upon failure of borrower
to pay any interest when due.293  Under the first possible maturity,
the phrase “notice of demand” certainly seems to suggest that there
would be a period of notice, that is, a period of time between the mak-
ing of the demand for payment and the maturity of the note.294  This
suggestion is significantly strengthened by the understanding of the
contracting parties and by their course of dealing.295  Thus, granting
the motion to dismiss was clearly inappropriate.
The court’s ultimate conclusion in this case is surprising given the
fact that, in its opinion, the court recognized the idea that specific
287. Reger, 592 F.3d at 762 (emphasis added).
288. Id.
289. See supra note 286.
290. See supra note 286.
291. Cf. Shawmut, 614 N.E.2d at 671 n.9 (stating that the bank gave the borrower
more time to pay the debt).
292. Reger, 592 F.3d at 762 (emphasis added).
293. Id.
294. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 277–78.
295. Reger, 592 F.3d at 763 (stating the borrower “expressed surprise” at the bank’s
actions).
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events of default may neuter contractual language describing a loan
as payable on demand.296  The court noted that cases from other juris-
dictions (Reid, for example) have addressed instruments with provi-
sions that look out of place in a demand note and those courts have
concluded that such notes are not demand notes.297  However, the
court incorrectly assumed that the only impact of language inconsis-
tent with a pure/traditional demand note is that it may cause the note
to be treated as a time note.298  The court failed to appreciate the sig-
nificant difference between a demand note and a demandable note.299
Thus, the only provision that seems to have been relevant to the Reger
court in this connection was an acceleration clause.  The court stated
that the Reger note did not contain an acceleration clause and there-
fore dismissed the significance of the provisions of the note that are
inconsistent with a pure/traditional demand note, and further ignored
the fact that the context and the course of dealing between the parties
were also inconsistent with a pure/traditional demand note.300  Fi-
nally, the court failed to recognize that the Reger note did contain at
least the semblance of an acceleration clause.301  That is, based on the
paragraph quoted above, it would seem that this note would have be-
come instantly mature upon the commencement of any insolvency or
bankruptcy proceedings by or against the maker, even in the absence
of a demand for payment by the holder, and perhaps immediately
upon the failure of the maker to make timely interest payments.302  In
the end, the court’s analysis is confused, erroneous, and very surpris-
ing—especially coming in the context of a dismissal for failure to state
a claim.
Finally, the court’s analysis regarding the illusory nature of the
agreement is also in error.  The court stated that a peppercorn may be
considered sufficient consideration to support a contract in a court of
law; a true, but irrelevant statement.303  The important issue in the
instant case was that at the time the loan documents were signed,
Reger Development did not even receive a peppercorn from National
City if the language “NOTWITHSTANDING ANY PROVISION OR
INFERENCE TO THE CONTRARY, LENDER SHALL HAVE NO
OBLIGATION TO EXTEND ANY CREDIT TO OR FOR THE AC-
COUNTANT BORROWER BY REASON OF THIS NOTE” was ap-
plied as written.304  Reger Development received exactly nothing.  As
296. Id. at 765.
297. Id. at 765–66.
298. Id.
299. Cf. Shawmut Bank, N.A. v. Miller, 614 N.E.2d 668, 671; supra note 286.
300. Reger, 592 F.3d at 765–66.
301. Id. at 765.
302. See supra note 287 and accompanying text.
303. Reger, 592 F.3d at 766.
304. Id. at 762.
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a result, at the time the loan documents were signed there was no
consideration and therefore no contract was created.305  The court cor-
rectly reasoned that once the loan was funded a contract existed be-
tween the parties, but that contract was implied-in-fact and based on
the actions of the parties and not on the written loan documents.306
That is, the reasonable interpretation of the parties’ conduct (i.e., Na-
tional City giving money to Reger Development) is that National City
made a loan to Reger Development.307  However, under this analysis,
the issue became what the terms of this implied contract were—an
issue the court completely missed.  The terms of the contract are de-
termined by the agreement between the parties at the time of con-
tracting, so in this case when National City actually gave funds to
Reger Development.  Thus, the loan documents represent only one
source of relevant information for determining the agreement of the
parties.  Other, perhaps more relevant sources of information would
include the understanding of the parties at the time the loan was actu-
ally funded, which would be determined in part by objective factors
such as the parties’ understanding of the borrower’s use of the loan
proceeds and the parties’ prior course of dealing.308  Moreover, the
principles underlying the obligation of good faith—the observance of
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing—would also be rele-
vant in determining the terms of the parties implied contract.309
Again, the court’s decision to grant the lender’s motion to dismiss in
this case was clearly in error.
V. CONCLUSION
Commercial borrowers often invest loan proceeds in such a way
that the funds are no longer liquid and cannot quickly be returned to a
cash state.310  Because of this, the needs of commercial borrowers are
often fundamentally at odds with the traditional legal interpretation
of demand notes that indulges the legal fiction that such notes are due
from the moment they are signed.311  As a result, when a demand note
is used to document a commercial loan there is often a pervasive dis-
connect between the needs of the borrower and the traditional legal
interpretation of demand notes.312  I argue here that this misunder-
standing does not occur between the actual negotiating parties—the
305. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 77 (1981) (Illusory and Alternative
Promises).
306. Id. § 19 (Conduct as Manifestation of Assent).
307. Id. § 202 (Rules in Aid of Interpretation).
308. Id.
309. Id. § 205 (Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing); see supra at notes 216–30 and
accompanying text.
310. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 12–15 and accompanying text.
312. See supra notes 68–78 and accompanying text.
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loan officer and the borrower—rather, the disconnect results from the
drafting efforts of lenders’ counsel and in fact is most likely to occur, in
my experience, when  lenders’ form documents are used to document a
loan.313
The Reger case is a good example of this phenomenon.  In that
case, the borrower, a real estate developer (funds invested in real es-
tate development cannot be easily returned to cash before the project’s
completion), signed a demand note, promised to pay, and paid a
$5,000 closing fee notwithstanding language in the documents that
said the lender had no obligation to make any loan of any kind for any
reason whatsoever to the borrower.314  In Reger, the bank’s form docu-
ments simply do not make sense in the context of the underlying
transaction.315  Moreover, this is usually the case when a demand
note is used to document a commercial loan, and the traditional inter-
pretation of demand notes is applied by a court to determine the rights
and obligations of the parties.316  I argue here that when a court is
faced with such a situation, Article 3 provides the tools necessary for
the court to adopt a reasonable interpretation of demand-type notes
that protects the interests of both the lender and the borrower.317
First, Section 1-304 imposes a general obligation of good faith on
the performance and enforcement of every contract under the
U.C.C.318  Article 1 also defines good faith as honesty in fact and the
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.319
Further, Section 1-302 provides that the parties are free to vary the
provisions of the U.C.C. by agreement, except, inter alia, the obliga-
tion of good faith,320 while Section 3-117 says:
[T]he obligation of a party to an instrument to pay the instrument may be
modified, supplemented, or nullified by a separate agreement of the obligor
and a person entitled to enforce the instrument, if the instrument is issued or
the obligation is incurred in reliance on the agreement or as part of the same
transaction giving rise to the agreement.321
In addition, Article 1 defines “agreement” broadly as “the bargain of
the parties in fact as found in their language or inferred from other
circumstances.”322  Finally, the use of the phrase “at will” in both Sec-
tion  3-108(c) and Section 1-309 draws a linkage between demand
notes used to document commercial loans and “at will” acceleration
313. See supra notes 19–67, 236–309 (discussing Reger Dev., LLC v. Nat’l City Bank,
592 F.3d 759 (7th Cir. 2010)).
314. See supra notes 19–33 and accompanying text.
315. See supra notes 85–129 and accompanying text.
316. See supra notes 70–84 and accompanying text.
317. See supra notes 216–30 and accompanying text.
318. See supra notes 216–30 and accompanying text.
319. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(20) (2001).
320. Id. § 3-102 (2001); see supra notes 190–93 and accompanying text.
321. U.C.C. § 3-117 (2002).
322. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(3).
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clauses, the enforcement of which the U.C.C. restricts to instances
where the lender in good faith believes that the prospect of payment or
performance has been impaired.323
In this Article I argue that courts should use these tools to inter-
pret demand notes used in commercial lending as having at least two,
and often three possible maturities.324  First, a note that simply pro-
vides that it is payable on demand could become mature a reasonable
time after demand for payment was made by the lender and the lender
would be free to make demand for payment at any time, for any rea-
son, and the decision to demand payment would not be subject to any
good faith obligation.325  But such a note would not become immedi-
ately due and payable upon demand by the lender unless the lender in
good faith believed that the prospect of payment performance had
been impaired.326  Rather, the note would become due and payable a
reasonable time after the demand for payment was made.327  If a Sec-
tion 3-108(c)-type note is used—one that provides for scheduled pay-
ments of principal and interest if no demand is made—then an
additional possible maturity would be upon the specific date or dates
referred to in the agreement, assuming no prior demand was made
and the borrower’s creditworthiness had not deteriorated during the
life of the loan.328  I argue that such an interpretation properly bal-
ances freedom of contract and good faith, and also protects the reason-
able expectations of both the lender and the borrower.329
323. See supra notes 141–61 and accompanying text.
324. See supra notes 162–77 and accompanying text.
325. See supra notes 162–65 and accompanying text.
326. See supra notes 166–73 and accompanying text.
327. See supra notes 166–73 and accompanying text.
328. See supra notes 174–77 and accompanying text.
329. See supra notes 162–77 and accompanying text.
